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1. Introduction 
Arctic challenges and opportunities will have significant repercussions on the life of European citizens for 
generations to come. It is imperative for the European Union to address them in 
 a coordinated and systematic manner. 
  
The Commission’s Communication on the EU and the Arctic (2008: 2) 
 
The Arctic region is said to serve as an early warning system for the impacts of 
climate change. It is receiving massive attention from scholars, scientists, politicians 
and the media as Arctic ice is melting at an alarming speed.1 During the last five 
decades, average temperatures in the region have risen almost twice as fast as the rest 
of the world (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004: 8; Bernstein, et al. 2007: 30; 
Cini 2007a). According to Bernstein et al. in the International Panel on Climate 
Change (2007: 46), Arctic late-summer sea ice might disappear almost entirely by the 
latter part of the 21st century.2 Perhaps even more importantly, a decrease in the 
enormous Greenland ice cap would cause global sea levels to rise considerably (Cf. 
Mernild, et al. 2009; U.S. Geological Survey 2000a). The consequences of the ice 
melting, however, are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, political leaders are 
becoming aware of the risks of rising sea levels and changing sea currents, projected 
to have a global impact on costal communities, water resources and human health 
(Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004: 2). On the other hand, the very fact that the 
ice is disappearing creates opportunities for a variety of actors within fields such as 
resource extraction, shipping, fisheries and tourism (Cf. Hoel and Vilhjamsson 2004; 
Phillips 2008; Skogrand 2008; Snyder 2007; U.S. Geological Survey 2000b).3 Global 
warming is thus creating an urgent need to balance possibilities for human activity in 
the Arctic with the fight against climate change. 
A potential gradual access to the Arctic Ocean raises questions such as what kind of 
governance mechanism should be used to manage activities in different sectors and 
                                              
1 This is not to deny the relevance of issues that might attract attention independently of climate change, such as legal 
obligations and commercial interests. 
2 Others report that northern polar waters could be ice-free in summers much sooner than 2040 (Amos 2007). 
3 It is important to note that the possibilities for exploiting the Arctic remain highly uncertain.  It is not known exactly how 
much oil and gas there is, how important the region will become in military terms or whether the sea passages and straits 
will actually attract the shipping industry (Cf. Lasserre 2009; Offerdal 2009) 
 2 
how to protect the Arctic environment while ensuring energy security.  In addition to 
the above questions jurisdictional issues in the Arctic marine realm are many and 
complex (Cf. Hoel 2009). The existing legal framework in the region, of which the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitutes the 
essence, is the current institutional basis for Arctic governance.4 In addition, the 
Arctic Council, although having little political clout, is an important body for 
cooperation and coordination among the Arctic states (Young 2009: 79). 
Nevertheless, some actors, such as the EU, have uttered concern about the ability of 
the legal framework to manage increased activity in the region. The European 
Commission has stated that the rules and regulations under UNCLOS and the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) need to be adopted to the particularities 
of the Arctic region concerning fair and sustainable regulations on navigation, 
fisheries and resource extraction (European Commission 2008e). 
There is also great uncertainty as to what states and actors will be involved in shaping 
the future of the region, what interests they will have and what course of action they 
will pursue. Some scholars and journalists warn about great-power politics and a race 
for resources, emphasising the inadequacy of international rules and regulations (cf. 
Borgerson 2008; Burkeman 2008; Graff 2007). Other scholars downplay the 
geopolitical importance of the region, emphasising the existing international legal 
framework and cooperation in the region (cf. Holtsmark 2009; Lasserre 2009; 
Offerdal 2009; Pedersen 2009; Rottem 2009). What is beyond doubt, however, is that 
developments in the Arctic attract the attention of actors and states far outside the 
Arctic Circle. In addition to the “Arctic Five”, i.e. Canada, the U.S., Russia, Denmark 
and Norway, countries and actors such as China, South Korea, Japan, NATO, and the 
European Union are carefully watching the course of development in the region 
(Arctic Council 2009; de Hoop Scheffer 2009; Hansen 2008; Jakobson 2010; Nøra 
2010; Se-jeong 2008). Indeed, as former EU commissioner Joe Borg (2009), has 
argued; “With new shipping routes, fish stocks moving north and the environmental 
                                              
4 There are a variety of governing mechanisms in place in addition to the Arctic Council, such as the International Maritime 
Organisation, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and coast guard cooperation amongst others.  
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implications of climate change, the Arctic has become a matter of concern far beyond 
the States bordering the Arctic Ocean”. With the increase in attention among external 
actors comes the need for knowledge about stakeholders and interests.  
According the European Commission (2009a), the European Union is the world’s 
largest trader, accounting for one fifth of global trade.5 It has a significant merchant 
fleet, and 90 per cent of its foreign trade is carried by the sea (Gateway to the 
European Union: Fisheries and Maritime Affairs). In addition, the Union is the 
world’s second largest importer of fisheries aquaculture products and one of the most 
important consumers of Arctic fish (European Commission 2008e: 7; Cf. European 
Commission 2008d). Furthermore, the EU has sworn to be a leader in the fight 
against climate change (Cf. European Commission Website). It is also heavily 
dependent on energy imports and concerned with energy security (Cf. European 
Commission 2009b). Moreover, three of its members, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, 
are Arctic states.  Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Area 
and Iceland is about to start membership talks with the Union (BBC 2010). 
According to the EU, the Arctic region and the Union will have a mutual impact on 
each other (Cf. European Commission 2008e). The 27 EU member states constitute 
an actor of considerable weight when they act together. Thus, the fact that they 
consider Arctic issues6 important enough to desire a standalone Arctic policy, should 
make it interesting to study how the Union handle the accomplishment of such a 
policy.7 
In March 2008, the High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the European Commission jointly published a paper to the 
European Council in which they highlighted security impacts of climate change.8 The 
                                              
5 It is not specified whether intra-EU trade is included.  
6 Arctic issues are taken to include any policy area that has either been mentioned in the Commission’s Communication or 
that could have implications for the Arctic or for the EU’s relationship with the region.  
7 According to the Oxford Online Dictionary (2010), the term “policy” signifies a course or principle of action adopted or 
proposed by an organization or individual. Furthermore, in a European Union context, it often refers to an overarching 
decision that is typically decided at a heads of state meeting (Informant C). 
8 The European Commission will also be referred to as simply the Commission. Similarly, the European Parliament will 
most often be referred to as the Parliament. The Council of the European Union or Council of Ministers (not to be confused 
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paper called for an “EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the 
Arctic region” (European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 
2008: 11).9 The European Parliament followed suit by adopting a resolution in 
October 2008 calling for a stronger role of the EU in Arctic matters, particularly in 
relation to protecting the Arctic environment (European Parliament 2008a). One 
month later the Commission published a communication which is said to constitute 
the first step of an Arctic policy for the EU (European Commission 2008e).10 The 
Council welcomed the document first in its Conclusions in December 2008, then 
again one year later.11 It presented 23 detailed points in the 2009 Conclusions to serve 
as guidelines for the future EU Arctic Policy (Swedish EU Presidency 2009). In 
short, European institutions have made several calls for an EU policy on the Arctic in 
the last two years. 
Until now the EU has not had a coordinated approach towards the Arctic, mostly due, 
of course, to the fact that the Arctic has not figured predominantly on the EU agenda 
(Airoldi 2008: 13). As Kristine Offerdal (2010: 39) argues, EU interest in the Arctic 
up until early 2008 was “ad hoc, coincidental, and to a certain extent based on the 
interest shown by individuals within the EU system”. According to Offerdal, the 
Commission desired a more consolidated policy around Arctic issues from 2006, but 
it remained unclear whether this policy was to be part of the Northern Dimension or 
the maritime strategy, or part of a broader foreign policy.12 Since 2008, the EU 
institutions as such have clearly devoted more attention to the Arctic, embracing the 
view that the current EU approach needs to be more coherent. Diana Wallis (2008), 
Vice-President of the Parliament in 2008, said in a speech to the Standing Committee 
                                                                                                                                           
with the European Council, which is composed of heads of state or governments, or with the Council of Europe, which has 
nothing do to with the EU) will be most often referred to as the Council.  
9 For the purpose of this thesis the term ‘Arctic’ will refer to the region above the Arctic Circle. It includes the Arctic Ocean 
and land territories of Russia, the U.S., Canada, two European Economic Area partners (Iceland and Norway) and three EU 
Member States (Denmark with Greenland, Finland and Sweden). Five countries are coastal states with special rights and 
obligation under international law; Russia, the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway.  
10 A Communication sets out the background and context to a given policy area. It may indicate the Commission's intended 
course of action in this field. It does not constitute a legislative proposal, but it may well accompany a legislative proposal 
in order to aid understanding of the proposed action (UK Local Government Association 2010). 
11 Council Conclusions are just one of the many acts of the Council. Other acts include regulations, directives, decisions, 
common positions, recommendations or opinions, declarations or resolutions (Cf. Council of the European Union Website) 
12 For an overview of the Northern Dimension, see the European Commission website on the Northern Dimension in the 
reference list. 
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of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region that same year that the EU already had 
an interest in the Arctic. This interest was rooted in firstly, the Northern Dimension 
policy, and, secondly, in various policy areas such as energy security, climate change, 
maritime issues, and fishing. Yet, she was frustrated at the “lack of coordination 
across these various areas” and thus the “failure to create a holistic Arctic policy 
within the EU”. Indeed, as Alexandr Vondra (2009), President-in-Office of the 
Council during the Czech Presidency in 2009, pointed out to the Parliament in April 
that same year, “issues with an Arctic dimension have tended to be addressed […] 
within the context of sectoral policies such as the maritime policy or the fight against 
climate change. […] the Union has not developed a broad Arctic policy bringing 
together all the relevant individual policy areas”.13  
The Commission Communication thus emphasises that “it is imperative for the 
European Union to address [Arctic challenges and opportunities] in a coordinated and 
systematic manner” (European Commission 2008a: 2). According to the Commission 
press release, the EU has to state its position concerning a unique region of strategic 
importance which is located in its immediate vicinity. “It is time for the EU to clearly 
assess its interest and develop a holistic and systematic Arctic approach. This will 
increase the efficiency of the EU’s action and open new opportunities for cooperation 
with the Arctic states” (European Commission 2008c). Mr. Vondra (2009) confirmed 
to the Parliament in 2009 that the Council is taking the issue of coordination 
seriously; “We fully recognise the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region. 
We agree that the European Union should have a comprehensive and coherent 
policy”. 
The principle of coherence, also referred to as consistency, in the external activities 
of the EU is not a new concept; it has been the subject of academic debate and a 
source of concern among European and national policy-makers for almost four 
decades (Caspers 2008: 19; Cf. Duke 1999; Duke 2000; Gauttier 2004; Missiroli 
                                              
13 The Presidency refers to the Council arrangement whereby each member state takes turns in presiding over the Council 
for a period of six months.  The Presidency plays an essential role in organising the work of the institution, particularly in 
promoting legislative and political decisions. It is responsible for organising and chairing all meetings, including the many 
working groups, and for brokering compromises (Cf. Council of the European Union Website). 
 6 
2001; Portela and Raube 2009; Michael Smith 2001).14 Its origins in EU external 
policy-making goes back to the late 1960s, and it has been recalled and altered in 
successive Treaty revisions ever since (Nuttall 2005: 94-96). Coherence, or 
consistency, is in fact a political requirement; according to the Single European Act 
(1986), there is a “responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever 
increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency […] in order more effectively 
to defend its common interests and independence” (Official Journal of the European 
Union 1987). Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) stipulates that the Union 
shall “ensure the consistency of its external relations as a whole” (Official Journal of 
the European Union 1992). As noted by Missiroli (2001: 4), “the assumption is […] 
that by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the EU [i.e. the member states 
and the community/union] becomes also, ipso facto, more efficient and effective 
(emphasis in the original).15 However, according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 
(2008: 121), “the EU’s complex system of competences, institutions, decision-
making procedures [and] policy-making processes […] cannot but lead to significant 
problems with regard to consistency”.16 Such a lack of coherence in EU external 
relations is “undermines its credibility as an international actor as well as its ability to 
achieve specific foreign policy goals” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 121). 
Furthermore, according to the literature on European foreign policy-making, the term 
coherence may be divided into three separate, but correlated types of coherence, to be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter; firstly, horizontal coherence between 
different policies and sectors, secondly, institutional coherence between the policy-
making institutions (i.e. the Commission, the Council and the Parliament), including 
intra-institutional coherence related to the internal dynamics of the institutions, and 
                                              
14 As will be explained in the theory chapter, the terms “coherence” and “consistency” are considered synonyms. According 
to Nuttall (2005: 93); “attempts to distinguish between them risk ending up in linguistic pedantry”. For the sake of clarity, 
however, “coherence” will be the preferred term throughout the thesis.  
15 The term “unitarily” is interpreted as signifying both horizontal coherence i.e. coherence among policy sectors and 
vertical coherence i.e. coherence between EU and member states’ policies (Duke 2000: 4; Missiroli 2001: 5).  
16 The term “competence” is “eurojargon” and is derived from the French word competence. It refers to the authority, 
responsibility or power to do or develop something. It is often used in the debate about European integration concerning 
what powers and responsibilities should be given to EU institutions and what should be left to national, regional and local 
authorities. 
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finally, vertical coherence between member-state policies and EU policies 
(Christiansen 2001; Duke 2000: 4; Missiroli 2001: 5; Nuttall 2005: 92).  
The focus of this thesis is on institutional coherence and the extent to which the 
institutions have so far conducted a coherent process of deliberation on Arctic issues. 
This will, in turn, allow a discussion of challenges and opportunities that the EU is 
facing in developing an Arctic Policy.  However, considering the extent to which the 
different types of coherence are interrelated it is difficult to analyse institutional 
coherence without also taking into account the other two other types. For example, 
studying the relationship between the Commission and the Council ultimately 
involves looking at the relationship between member states and the Commission, or, 
in other words, vertical coherence. Furthermore, Arctic issues involve several policy 
sectors within pillars and between pillars (cross-pillar issues).17 The term “cross-
pillar” refers to issues or policies that involve more than one type of cooperation 
among the EU institutions. Arctic issues thus necessitate coordination between policy 
sectors i.e. horizontal coherence. This might, in turn, involve challenges to 
institutional coherence among the Commission and the Council and the Parliament, 
particularly if they were to pursue different objectives.18 Therefore, in order to 
address institutional coherence in the EU’s approach to Arctic issues, it will be 
necessary to also address aspects of horizontal and vertical coherence.  
Considering the issue of coherence in European foreign policy in general and the 
desire for a coherent EU Arctic policy in particular, the research question of this 
thesis is as follows: 
With a focus on institutional coherence, what are the main challenges and 
opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy?  
To address the research question, the study draws on insights offered by the literature 
on foreign policy analysis (FPA) and on European Foreign Policy (EFP), approached 
                                              
17 The term “pillar” is used to illustrate the various forms of cooperation within the EU depending on which policy area and 
which part of the treaty provisions is involved (Folketinget Website). 
18 See Appendix i: Institutional competences in the EU for more information about the pillars of EU policy-making.  
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from a Multi-level Governance perspective (MLG). MLG is supplemented with 
aspects of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. While FPA and EFP 
provides the basic theoretical foundation for understanding European foreign policy, 
MLG as a decision-making system offers a “useful and neutral characterisation of 
EFP, breaking free from debates over whether the EU can have a FP and over 
whether liberalism or realism is the right theory of choice” (Ginsberg 2001: 32) 
Furthermore, the concept of coherence in foreign policy will be employed in order to 
structure the empirical findings in a clear and constructive manner.   
This thesis is empirical, descriptive and explorative in nature, and largely based on 
empirical material and findings. It analyses a policy in the making, thus necessitating 
a broad focus rather than a narrow one. Consequently, the aim is not to test 
hypothesis to explain a certain outcome. Rather, the study is guided by an eclectic 
theoretical and analytical framework which will be outlined in the following chapter, 
and from which a set of assumptions is derived.  Firstly, based on MLG, the thesis 
assumes that in developing an EU Arctic policy, all three institutions, i.e. the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament will have influence and powers in the 
policy-process. One way of assessing the roles of the institutions in the Arctic Policy 
process is to look at the issue of competences. Thus, a discussion of competences and 
the nature of Arctic issues will be provided in chapter three. Secondly, based on 
aspects of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism it is assumed that the three 
institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which 
might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. To 
this end, both internal dynamics as well as the relationship between the institutions 
will be analysed. The abovementioned assumptions will be addressed more 
thoroughly in the next chapter.  
1.1 Objectives and limitations 
The aim of this thesis is to highlight some of the most important challenges and 
opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic policy. Two 
further, but more implicit, objectives are to provide indications as to the future nature 
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of the EU Arctic approach as well as making suggestion as to the future research on 
the EU and the Arctic. The nature of the study is explorative. Not only is the future of 
the Arctic itself highly uncertain; there is not yet any fully developed EU policy to 
study. European policy-makers do not know what the policy will comprise or to 
whose competence it will fall. Yet, studying how a large actor such as the EU 
addresses Arctic issues and aims for a standalone Arctic policy is interesting. It will 
contribute to the literature on both the Arctic as well as EU foreign policy-making. 
Firstly, looking at challenges and opportunities for a coherent EU Arctic policy will 
provide knowledge about the EU as an actor in the Arctic. As mentioned earlier, the 
actions of external actors related to issues such as resource extraction, shipping and 
governance might have a potential impact on the region itself as well as the wider 
international community. However, at this stage, very little research is yet available 
on the external actors that take an interest in Arctic issues other than the “Arctic 
Five”.19 Yet, as stated in the Norwegian High North Strategy, decision-makers in 
various countries have discovered that “the importance of Arctic stretches far beyond 
the borders of Norway” (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 5). According to a report by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009, the EU has evolved into a 
regional and global actor to be reckoned with and the increasing attention to the 
Arctic by EU institutions and member states involves both opportunities for 
cooperation and challenges related to issues such as governance and fisheries 
(Utenriksdepartementet 2009). Consequently, there is a need to acquire knowledge 
about the EU’s approach to the Arctic.  
Secondly, revealing and analysing the complex nature of creating coherent and 
integrated foreign policies in the EU would further contribute to studies on European 
foreign policy-making, particularly when it comes to policy areas which do not neatly 
fit into any one pillar or conceptual framework. As the chapter on theory will suggest, 
such policies are difficult to approach analytically. How to analyse EU policies on 
which all three institutions seem to have some influence and which are neither purely 
external, nor purely internal policies? Furthermore, with the entry into force of the 
                                              
19 As on May 2010.  
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Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, studies of EU policy-making must be updated. 
Although the thesis will only briefly assess the implications of the treaty it 
nevertheless highlights potential questions and challenges that the new arrangements 
might entail. One important implication of the treaty is that the Parliament receives 
more power, and that consequently, it must be devoted more attention when analysing 
EU foreign policy than before, not to mention when studying cross-pillar issues such 
as the Arctic Policy.   
The thesis does not, however, attempt to analyse possible implications of a coherent 
EU approach for the EU’s ability to influence Arctic developments as a foreign 
policy actor. Furthermore, nor does it attempt to analyse the various reasons for why 
the EU is developing an Arctic policy. Rather, the starting point is to note that the EU 
is devoting attention to the Arctic, whatever the reasons might be, and then proceed 
from there with analysing opportunities and challenges in the current process.  
1.2 Organisation of thesis 
The thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter two introduces relevant 
methodological issues, paying particular attention to the explorative nature of the 
thesis as well as to the most important sources of data; official documents and 
interviews. It also presents the analytical framework of FPA and MLG before 
explaining in detail the concept around which the analysis will be structured, namely 
the concept of institutional coherence in foreign policy making.20 Chapter three first 
describes the roles of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament in the policy-
process and addresses the issue of competences. The second part is devoted to 
discussing the first assumption of this thesis, namely that the process of developing 
an Arctic policy is influenced by all three institutions. Chapter four and five analyse 
the second assumption, namely that the three institutions will have slightly different 
approaches to Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a 
                                              
20 Note that due to the interconnectedness of the three concepts of coherence mentioned earlier, horizontal and vertical 
coherence will also be addressed and mentioned when considered relevant.  
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coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. However, before analysing inter-
institutional relations, it is important to be aware of internal dynamics as these might 
affect the approaches of the institutions. Thus, chapter four assesses the internal 
dynamics of the institutions as well as their actions towards Arctic issues. Chapter 
five assesses the relationship between firstly, the Commission and the Council and, 
secondly, the Commission and the Council on the one hand, and the Parliament on 
the other. Finally, in the concluding remarks the potential lessons from this study will 
be added together before providing indications as to the current and potential 
challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic 
policy.  
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2. Methodology and Analytical Framework 
2.1 Qualitative research design 
2.1.1 Descriptive explorative case study 
This paper sets out to study challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in 
developing a coherent Arctic policy by relying on documents and twelve in depth 
interviews. The study cannot be an explanatory thesis of causal relationships due to 
the fact that there is not yet any fully developed policy to study. Its aim is thus not to 
attempt to explain a certain outcome, or the lack of such. Rather, the subject is a 
policy in the making and the aim is to analyse the potential for and challenges to a 
coherent EU approach to the Arctic. This is what Yin (2003: 5) would call an 
exploratory research design. Such a design is often appropriate for questions focusing 
mainly on “what”, as opposed to explanatory studies asking “why”. It is typically 
used when a researcher examines a new interest or when the subject of study itself is 
relatively new (Babbie 2009: 92; Jacobsen 2005: 61). Although there is a substantial 
scholarly literature on the Arctic and on EU foreign policy-making respectively, very 
little research has been conducted on the relationship between the EU and the Arctic, 
and even less research has yet been done on the EU Arctic Policy specifically.21 An 
explorative design, however, does not preclude the presentation of theoretically 
founded assumptions based on the literature on European policy-making, nor does it 
preclude an analysis similar to one found in explanatory studies. The boundaries 
between explorative, descriptive and explanatory studies are, after all, blurred. One of 
the main differences between this thesis and explanatory studies, however, is that the 
conclusions drawn concerning the on-going policy-process must be regarded as 
tentative rather than assertive. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions based on existing 
literature, official documents and interviews may provide a valuable indication as to 
the actual and potential challenges and opportunities in developing an EU Arctic 
                                              
21 As of May 2010.  
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policy. This would thus ultimately contribute knowledge about the EU as an actor in 
the Arctic.  
2.1.2 Questions of validity and reliability 
In order to ensure the relevance and trustworthiness of the empirical information 
collected, four specific concepts commonly used in political science to ensure the 
quality of research will be been considered, namely construct validity, internal and 
external validity and reliability (Adcock and Collier 2001; Hoyle, et al. 2002; Yin 
2003). However, because such methodological criteria must be adapted to the specific 
research in question, the following section will pay particular attention to questions of 
validity and reliability related to case studies and interviews.  
Firstly, to ensure that the observations of the study capture the ideas contained in the 
concepts which it is attempting to measure, two steps have been taken (Adcock and 
Collier 2001: 529; Hoyle, et al. 2002: 33)22: Firstly, concepts and terms used in the 
interviews have been explained and defined as it is imperative that the interviewees 
understand what is being asked of them (Yin 2003: 56). Secondly, findings have been 
based on a method of triangulation (Jacobsen 2005: 216; Yin 2003: 98). Indeed, a 
major strength (and necessity) of case study data collection concerning issues of 
validity and reliability is the use of multiple sources (Yin 2003: 97). The thesis is 
based on information collected from a combination of various primary and secondary 
sources such as speeches, political declarations, official EU documents, reports by 
non-state actors in the Arctic, and publications by independent research institutions.  
Secondly, although one of the most common definitions of internal validity defines it 
as “the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the causal effects of one 
variable on another”, descriptive or explorative studies need a different “test” of 
internal validity (Hoyle, et al. 2002: 32; Yin 2003: 36). Since such studies are not 
concerned with causal inferences, the concept of internal validity may rather be 
                                              
22 For an excellent visual overview over measurement validation, see Adcock and Collier (2001: 531).  
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defined as the perceived correctness and trueness of the findings (Jacobsen 2005: 
214- 216). The latter kind of validity may subsequently be attained by asking a set of 
critical questions related to information and sources. Have the right people been 
interviewed, and have they been able and willing to convey accurate information? 
The interviewees chosen for this study are among those who know the most about 
EU-Arctic relations in the EU and in Norway. They are middle to high-level officials 
or senior advisors working within the EU system of governance or within the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry who are accustomed to EU terms and language. 
However, considering firstly, the uncertainty surrounding a policy in the making, 
secondly, the complexity of the European system of policy-making, and thirdly, the 
uncertainty related to changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, it is possible that the 
interviewees have not been able to provide flawless information. In addition, as in 
political processes in general there may be political restraints which impede the 
interviewees from releasing sensitive information. An effort has been made to ask the 
respondents about processes in which they, themselves, have taken part in and about 
what they have heard and observed. Nevertheless, the fact that the respondents and 
informants are, among the few, foremost experts on EU-Arctic relations in the EU 
should increase the legitimacy of the study’s findings. Although there will be 
elements that could inflict upon the quality of the research in this thesis, much has 
been done to ensure its validity by critically scrutinising the sources from which the 
data has been derived.   
Thirdly, external validity concerns the degree to which the findings of the study are 
generalizable (Cf. Ch. 2 in Hoyle, et al. 2002; Yin 2003: 38). Studying the EU Arctic 
Policy is ultimately a case of EU foreign policy-making, and more specifically, about 
coherence in European foreign policy making. However, there are issues with 
generalising from this study. It is not clear whether the EU Arctic Policy is 
representative of the “population” i.e. EU foreign policy. Arctic issues are mixed in 
nature, cutting across both internal and external policies as well as external relations 
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and CFSP.23 There are not many similar cases available. What is possible, however, is 
to use the findings of this case to say something about how new, and cross-pillar 
policy areas with foreign policy implications are handled by the EU.  
Finally, to achieve a high degree of reliability, a common question to ask is whether a 
later researcher who did the same case study over again following the same procedure 
would reach the same conclusions (Jacobsen 2005: 230; King, et al. 1994: 25; Yin 
2003: 37). Researchers should therefore be explicit about methods and procedures 
used to gather information (George and Bennett 2005: 106; King, et al. 1994: 27). 
The fact that, firstly, sources are consistently referred to in this thesis; secondly, that 
the methodology chapter thoroughly explains how the research has been conducted; 
thirdly, that official documents can easily be accessed online; and, finally, that 
interview guides are included and that interview notes are available upon request 
should provide a considerable degree of reliability.  
2.1.3 Collection of empirical data 
Considering that official documents and interviews with key informants constitute the 
most important sources of information, these two data sources will receive particular 
attention in the following two sections.  
Document analysis 
For the purpose of data collection, both primary and secondary documentary material 
has been central to this thesis. Moreover, since the focus of the study is the European 
institutions primary sources such as official statements, parliamentary session records 
and communications are considered particularly important. However, relying on 
documents to gather information in a manner that satisfies standards of validity and 
reliability requires attention to specific methodological issues. Although some of 
these documents offer quite transparent information, such as meeting minutes from 
parliamentary sessions, other documents may offer more limited information: On the 
                                              
23 The policy might comprise measures to reduce pollution from the EU into the Arctic (internal) or measures related to for 
example navigation (external). It might also include trade issues (external relations) or security issues (CFSP).  
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one hand, Council Conclusions or parliamentary resolutions only contain information 
to which all parties could agree, thus providing a realistic perception of the 
institution’s position on a topic. On the other hand, they offer little insight into the 
internal dynamics in the process that led to the final documents, such as if there were 
divisions and what issues, if any, caused disagreement. Consequently, it becomes 
particularly important not only to focus on what is said in the document as what is not 
said, i.e. gaps or omissions (Flick 2007: 111). In the words of George and Bennett 
(2005: 100), every researcher analysing a document should consider “who is speaking 
to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances (emphasis in the original)”. 
For example, the Communication on the Arctic published by the Commission is a 
public document and might convey a particular view of a situation, or institution in 
question (Jacobsen 2005: 181). Considering that the Commission is a supranational 
institution whose purpose is to push forward with integration it is possible that the 
Communication might exaggerate the possibilities for EU cooperation on the Arctic 
(Cf. European Commission 2007a). Therefore, to avoid mistaken assumption and 
interpretations, information need to be cross-checked with secondary sources, such as 
academic papers and newspaper articles. Although there is not much literature on the 
EU and the Arctic, there has been written quite extensively on Arctic issues of geo-
political and environmental nature, not to mention on European policy-making in 
general, something which provides a valuable understanding of the research topic. By 
addressing the issues above, documents should constitute a good source of 
information on which to base the study of the EU Arctic Policy.   
Interviews 
To accompany and supplement the use of documentary data, twelve semi-structured 
in depth interviews with officials and diplomats in Norway and in the EU have been 
conducted.24 Considering Norway’s particular competence on Arctic issues, 
combined with the fact that the country has had a dialogue with the EU on such issues 
                                              
24 According to Jacobsen (2005: 171) a respondent is someone who has direct knowledge about a phenomenon e.g. 
someone having first-hand experience or being a member of the group being studied whereas an informant is someone who 
does not himself or herself represent the phenomenon or group in question, but who possess extensive knowledge about the 
topic. For the purpose of this thesis the word ‘interviewee’ will refer to both respondents and informants.  
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for at least the last three years, Norwegian officials working on Arctic issues could 
provide a valuable insight into the policy process (Cf. Støre 2008a, 2008b). In 
addition, such informants might provide an “outside” look on EU policy-making. The 
EU officials that were interviewed either work with Arctic issues on a daily basis or 
have extensive knowledge about the policy process. However, due to reasons of 
confidentiality, it is not possible to go into further detail about the identities of the 
informants and respondents.25  
Most interviews were conducted over a period of two weeks and lasted approximately 
one hour each. The respondents and informants spoke on behalf of themselves and 
who they represent. Consequently, it is not possible to know the extent to which their 
answers represent the institution in its entirety; however, that was neither the purpose. 
Each person was asked a set of standard questions about the EU Arctic Policy 
followed by specific questions depending on his or her post in the EU system, as well 
as his or her kind of expertise on the topic. Furthermore, new knowledge accumulated 
during the field work as well as the direction of each conversation also guided what 
questions were asked. Due to the fact that the policy is in the making and that some 
topics are therefore considered somewhat sensitive, most interviewees preferred not 
to have the conversation recorded. As it was vital to the study that the interviewees 
provided different information than was already published in official documents, the 
possibilities for attaining such information gained a higher priority than the issue of 
recording. Consequently, there are not transcripts from the interviews available. The 
interview guides, however, are included in the thesis, and the notes from the 
interviews are available upon request.26 
Although, according to Bryman (2004: 319), the interview is probably the most 
widely used method in qualitative research, important questions nevertheless need to 
be addressed, such as how to avoid posing leading questions and how to analyse the 
interview afterwards. Notwithstanding the existence of some methodological 
                                              
25 For more information, see appendix three with the list of informants. 
26 Although the interview guides differed slightly from one interview to another due to reasons stated above, all questions 
have, for practical purposes, been included in two interview guides divided according to themes; one guide for Norwegian 
officials and one guide for EU officials. 
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guidelines, the qualitative interview as a method of collecting data lacks, as opposed 
to the quantitative interview, standard rules of procedure, hence the common 
denotations “unstructured” and “semi-structured” interviews. Indeed, while detailed 
interview guides were prepared for this thesis, a high degree of flexibility was 
necessary as it often turned out more relevant to speak about topics rather than asking 
specific questions. Furthermore, in relation to the interview as a source of 
information, Yin (2003: 92) points out that “it is subject to the same problems such as 
bias, poor recall and inaccurate articulation as other sources of evidence”. On a few 
occasions, an interviewee would point out that he or she was not sure about the 
correctness of a detail, thus making it important to get it verified by other 
interviewees and documents. In addition, considering that all of the interviewees were 
what Andersen (2006: 282) would call highly competent people with an excessive 
knowledge about the topic, measures were taken to avoid interviewees adapting 
conversations to their own agenda. In sum, by cross-checking the interviews with 
primary sources, such as official documents, reports, and public statements, it should 
be possible to reach valid and empirically reliable conclusions.  
Moreover, much can be done to facilitate a good interview beforehand. The aim of 
the data collection was to gather highly specialised information on several particular 
topics. Therefore, most interviewees were chosen on the basis of what kind of, and 
how good, information they were likely to provide, or as Bryman (2004: 334) would 
call it, on the basis of “purposive sampling”. In addition, the snowball sampling 
method, in which the informants and respondents recommended other possible 
interviewees, was occasionally used, particularly in the beginning (Jacobsen 2005: 
174). Concerning ethical issues, the role of a researcher involves a scientific 
responsibility; a commitment towards independent research; and, lastly, a 
responsibility in relation to the interviewee (Kvale 1997: 69). Since the two former 
issues have already been dealt with in earlier sections, it suffices to mention that all 
interviewees were informed about the purpose of the study and why they were 
considered to be of interest. They also received a list of the topics to be covered 
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beforehand. The informants could choose between different degrees of anonymity, 
and were also given the opportunity to review their remarks.27 All but one of the 
interviewees expressed concerns about their anonymity and preferred to be referred to 
as “officials” or “advisors”, and a few asked to approve citations. Notwithstanding 
the potential loss of credibility due to the interviewees’ anonymity, valuable 
information should be possible to obtain from the twelve informants and respondents 
on the EU and the Arctic if addressing the issues discussed above pertaining to 
interviews as a source. To conclude this chapter thus far, the first section has 
accounted for the explorative nature of the study, questions related to ensuring valid 
and reliable research as well as presenting the main sources of information, namely 
documents and interviews. The last part of the chapter will provide an analytic and 
theoretical framework that should permit a structured understanding of the empirical 
findings of the study. 
2.2 Analytical framework 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the main challenges and opportunities that the EU 
is facing in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy by focusing on institutional 
coherence. The study is a highly empirical work of which the aim is neither to 
develop, nor test theory. This, however, does not alleviate the need to be precise 
about the analytical assumptions that are guiding the research, or the need to 
theoretically structure the analysis. For analytical purposes this thesis defines the 
Arctic Policy as European foreign policy and employs a Foreign Policy Analysis 
approach (FPA). FPA is then adapted to the study of European foreign policy (EFP), 
providing theoretical premises for studying the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
However, since FPA, like International Relations, can be studied from a variety of 
perspectives, and since “any discussion of European foreign policy, in short, is part of 
a wider debate about European integration”, the Multi-Level-Governance (MLG) 
perspective is employed. Furthermore, because MLG only says something about 
                                              
27 See Kvale (1997: 66-71) on ethical issues related to conducting interviews.  
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which institutions will influence the policy-process, and not anything about their 
expected behaviour, MLG will be supplemented with elements from neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism (White 2004: 14). Finally, the concepts of 
coherence will provide a structuring tool with which to analyse possible challenges 
and opportunities in developing an EU Arctic policy. 
The reason for applying such an eclectic framework is that the EU is arguably a 
unique actor in international relations. There does not seem to be any one particular 
model or theory that grasps the complex picture that this thesis is aiming to 
disentangle. The subject in question is neither a state, nor a federation. The issues in 
question, although defined as foreign policy, are not purely external foreign policy 
issues, nor purely internal EU issues. Furthermore, considering that the focus is on a 
policy in the making, it is not possible to “test” whether theories of European 
integration, such as neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism, is more suitable for 
explaining, or predicting, the coming into existence, or failure of the EU Arctic 
Policy. Rather, given that the aim is to address challenges and opportunities in an 
empirical manner, elements from both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism 
will be employed. This will arguably serve to better highlight different aspects of the 
challenges and opportunities in the policy process. The paper focuses on institutional 
coherence, including intra-institutional coherence, as well as referring to horizontal 
and vertical coherence. The rest of the chapter discusses the abovementioned 
theoretical aspects in chronological order, beginning with FPA, and ending with 
presenting the premises and assumptions underpinning the study.  
2.2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis and European foreign policy28 
In the simplest terms, [FPA] is the study of the process, effects, causes, or 
outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-
specific manner. The underlying and often implicit argument theorizes that 
human beings, acting as a group or within a group, compose and cause 
change in international politics. (Foreign Policy Analysis Website) 
                                              
28 This study takes a broad view on foreign policy, adhering to the view of Christopher Hill (2003: 3) who defines foreign 
policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in IR”. As for the term 
‘European’, it refers to the EU, not the whole of Europe. For a debate about EU versus European, see Brian White (2004).  
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Being a sub-field within International Relations (IR) since it emerged in the 1950s, 
the literature and debate on FPA is too rich to be adequately accounted for here.29 
Suffice to say that firstly, it can be studied with a variety of theoretical approaches, 
and, secondly, the very nature of the approach as well as the extent to which it 
represents a field sufficiently distinct from IR to be considered a proper analytical 
approach is disputed (Steve Smith, et al. 2008: 3; Cf. White 2004).30  
In line with Valerie Hudson’s conception of FPA (2007: 4-5), the focus of this thesis 
is on decisions taken by decision-makers with reference to, or having known 
consequences for entities external to their nation-state. Such decisions may directly 
target external entities in the form of influence attempts, but they may also target 
domestic entities which could have ramifications for external entities. For example, it 
might be argued that the EU’s three objectives when it comes to the Arctic, namely 
protecting and preserving the Arctic; promoting sustainable use of resources; and 
contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance, seem to target both external 
and internal entities with implications for the Arctic (Cf. European Commission 
2008e).  
However, using a FPA approach to study European foreign policy, involves 
addressing an important conceptual issue related to the explanandum; FPA was 
developed to analyse states. According to White (2004: 11), contrary to traditional 
foreign policy analysis and IR theory, EFP cannot be studied from a state-centric 
analysis with relatively clear boundaries between internal and external policy 
environments. The EU’s place in international politics is sui generis (Ginsberg 2001: 
12). Indeed, in the words of Carlsnaes (2004a: 1); “what is often referred to as a 
distinctly complex and multilayered European foreign policy system, based not on 
traditional state boundaries but on a progressively robust form of transnational 
governance represents a novelty and a challenge to conventional foreign policy 
analysis”. Indeed, many scholars writing on EFP have explicitly rejected the “state-
                                              
29 For a detailed overview over the history, debate and literature of FPA, see for example Hudson (2008) or Carlsnaes 
(2003).  
30 For a short overview, see White (1999). 
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centric approach and narrow focus of traditional IR, with its concentration on the 
formal institutions and policy outcomes of CFPS” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 12). 
Others on the other hand, such as Karen Smith (2003) and Hazel Smith (2002) do not 
see a problem with applying conventional FPA to EFP. They argue that the EFP 
indeed can be said to resemble the foreign policies of nation-states, thus rejecting the 
view that the EU is sui generis, basing their answer on “traditional conceptions of 
what -- at least in their view -- foreign policy analysis is all about”(Carlsnaes 2004b: 
5).31  
As for the explanans, Carlsnaes (2003: 334) asserts that there have been two 
influential traditions in FPA; the first favouring state-centrist material systemic level 
factors in explaining foreign policy, and the second focusing on the linkages between 
actors, policy processes and policy outputs, i.e. emphasising the role of domestic 
factors. However, as Jean A. Garrison (2003: 155) argues, it is now broadly accepted 
that different levels of analysis such as individual factors, input into the decision-
making process, and institutional factors converge to shape foreign policy outputs. 
Neverthelss, due to the particular nature of the EU, applying FPA to EFP also involve 
challenges related to the explanans. According to White, EFP necessitates different 
methods of analysis as it is a different subject matter than that dealt with by FPA in 
the past. What is needed is to combine the framework of FPA with theories of 
European policy-making, e.g. MLG.  
To sum up the above discussion, the EU poses challenges to FPA both in terms of 
defining the explanandum and in terms of choosing the appropriate method for 
analysing the explanandum. However, if the above challenges are adequately 
addressed, FPA may provide two important premises for studying EFP. Firstly, the 
EU will not behave as a unitary actor, or state in the process of developing an Arctic 
policy. Rather it is a multilayered policy system which must reconcile the national 
with the supranational. This is important to keep in mind when studying the EU’s 
                                              
31 The scholars mentioned in the discussion, however, all agree that EFP must be defined in broader terms than just the 
CFSP. See for example Carlsnaes (2003, 2004a, 2004b); Ginsberg (1999); White (1999, 2004, 2001); Smith (2003) or 
Smith (2002) For a brief, well-structured overview over the conceptual difference between scholars of EFP, see Carlsnaes 
(2004b). 
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ability to develop foreign policies as opposed to nation-states. Secondly, EU foreign 
policy is more than the formal institutions and outcomes of the CFSP, thus requiring 
a broader definition of EU foreign policy and a more holistic analysis of the Arctic 
Policy, both when it comes to the actors and the policy process. However, as has been 
mentioned earlier FPA is a discipline; like IR it needs to be studied with a theoretical 
approach. Moreover, the unique nature of the EU implies a need to combine a FPA 
approach in the study of the Union’s Arctic Policy with theories of European studies. 
As White (2004: 14) points out; “the notion of a European foreign policy is a 
controversial idea subject […] to the same passions and emotions as the whole 
process of European integration evokes. Therefore, any discussion of European 
foreign policy, in short, is part of a wider debate about European integration”.  
2.2.2 A Multi-Level Governance perspective on FPA 
Until the Arctic appeared as a major factor in the context of climate change, it was 
individual member-states or interest groups in the EU that drove interactions with the 
Arctic region (Airoldi 2008: 13). However, Arctic issues have gradually received 
more attention by the institutions themselves in the EU as climate change has 
emerged as a global challenge (Airoldi 2008: 13).  The Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament have all contributed to the process of developing an EU Arctic 
approach by promoting Arctic issues and issuing formal documents. Furthermore, as 
will be further elaborated upon in the next chapter, while the member-states without 
doubt remain the most important decision-makers, one cannot dismiss the influence 
and power of the Commission and the Parliament, even in foreign policy as defined 
in this paper, and particularly concerning cross-pillar issues. There are thus two major 
reasons why MLG is considered the most appropriate theory for studying the Arctic 
policy-process: Firstly, the aim of this paper is to address challenges and 
opportunities in developing an EU Arctic policy in an empirical way, and not whether 
or not, according to a specific theory or model, the policy is likely to be developed. 
Secondly, there will be varying degrees of supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism depending on whether the Arctic issues in question are CFSP 
related or pillar one related. In other words, MLG allows for a more nuanced and 
 24 
holistic approach to the issue of coherence in the EU Arctic approach than would 
neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism alone.  
Governance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement, 
and enforce rules in a specified policy domain. Multi-level governance 
refers to the sharing of this authority across an institutionalized, 
hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of 
unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources. 
(Michael E. Smith 2004: 743) 
Until Gary Marks (and Lisbeth Hooghes) (Cf. 2001; 1993; 1992; 2003, 1996) coined 
Multi-level Governance almost two decades ago, studies of the European Union had 
been dominated by the grand theories of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism.32 These theories sought not only to account for how the EU 
functioned, but also sought to explain European integration. In contrast to 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, middle-range theories of governance, 
such as MLG, do not primarily seek to explain the establishment or development of 
the Community institutions, but rather aim to understand modes and process patterns 
of European policy-making and explaining the EU as a political system already in 
existence (Bache and George 2006: 22; Pollack 2005; Rosamond 2007: 121; 
Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004: 657). In other words, unlike integration theory 
for which the shape of the EU-polity is the dependent variable, MLG considers the 
EU-polity the independent variable (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 245). This is an important 
benefit of the MLG perspective as it makes it possible to study challenges and 
opportunities in the EU Arctic Policy process in terms of what is there and not why it 
is there or should be there.  
What spurred the development of governance theories is what Gary Marks  (1993: 
401-402), drawing on the policy network approach to domestic politics, initially 
called “a centrifugal process in which decision-making is spun away from member 
states in two directions, namely to the subnational as well as the supranational levels” 
                                              
32 The roots of MLG are to be found in earlier neo-functionalist theories in the works of Earnst de Haas (1958) and Leon 
Linbreg (1963), see Hooghe (1996).  
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(Marks and Hooghe 2003: 2).33 Although central governments remain the most 
important policy-makers a variety of actors at European, national and subnational 
level are now said to share decision-making responsibility. On an increasing amount 
of legislation, for example, the European Parliament now co-decides with the 
Council. Writings on MLG converge on the belief that the dispersion of governance 
across multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient than, and normatively superior to, 
central state monopoly (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 3).34 MLG thus aims to consolidate 
several related strands of literature that regard European integration as a challenge to 
the role of the state, thus taking for granted a certain amount of supranational 
governance (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998: 2-3). It can therefore be considered an 
alternative approach to the state-centric model of intergovernmentalism (Bache and 
Flinders 2004b: 34).  
MLG has increasingly been regarded as a useful perspective with which to study 
European foreign policy. The “value added” of the theory is that it explains how 
common general interests are defined, prioritized, and translated into concrete policy 
actions through institutionalized behaviours at the EU and domestic levels (Michael 
E. Smith 2004: 743). Whereas classical European integration theories consider the 
link between the EU and its external environment only to a limited extent, MLG 
makes it possible to focus on how the EU’s governance system affects its capacity to 
act towards the outside (Filtenborg, et al. 2002: 389). What characterises European 
foreign policy is, according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 31), the 
interaction between the national and the European level, varying depending on the 
issue at hand. However, they continue, it is not simply a two-level game as policy-
making does not exclusively occur at these levels (Cf. Putnam 1988). Indeed, EU 
foreign policy can be conceptualized as a complex multilevel foreign policy, with 
different actors at different levels having different competences and obligations 
related to different issues and policy frameworks. Michael Smith (2004: 741) has a 
                                              
33 The two most relevant levels for this thesis, given the current progress of the process, are the national and supranational 
levels. It does therefore not consider sub-national levels or private actors.  
34 There is no agreement, however, about how multi-level governance should be organized (Cf. Marks and Hooghe 2003). 
For information about type one and two of MLG, see Marks and Hooghe (2003).   
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similar view (although analysis CFSP only), arguing that the use of multi-level 
governance helps to avoid the pitfalls of intergovernmental approaches to EU foreign 
policy, such as two-level games or liberal intergovernmentalism (Cf. Moravcsik 
1993). Allegedly, while these two approaches may be useful for analysing high-level 
negotiations about treaty reforms, they are problematic in describing normal policy 
outcomes. In fact, an apparent advantage of MLG is that it, in virtue of being a 
decision-making system, offers a useful and neutral characterisation of EFP, without 
having to debate whether the EU can have a FP and whether liberalism or realism is 
the right theory to use (Ginsberg 2001: 32).35  
The main contribution of MLG to the study of the EU Arctic Policy is that firstly, it 
permits focusing on policy-making as opposed to European integration. Secondly, it 
provides a framework with which to analyse a complex policy issue which is subject 
to both supranational and intergovernmental decision-making. Finally, it assumes a 
role for other institutions than the Council, namely the Commission and the 
Parliament. This third contribution is, in fact, the first assumption of this thesis, 
namely that that all three institutions in the EU have influence and a role to play in 
developing the Arctic policy. However, whereas MLG permits making the important 
assumption that all three institutions are relevant actors, it does not say much about 
how they behave or relate to each other. Having assumptions about the roles and 
behaviours of the institutions during the policy-process is important when studying 
institutional coherence as it might reveal differences in the institutions’ approaches 
towards Arctic issues. Thus, MLG will, for the purpose of this thesis, be 
supplemented with relevant elements from the theories of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism36.  
                                              
35 Note that MLG is a somewhat controversial approach and MLG theory building is not yet complete (Cf. Bache and 
Flinders 2004a; Piattoni 2009). According to Piattoni (2009: 165), for example, “The weapon that had allowed Marks to 
create a conceptual space for MLG (i.e. to say what MLG was not), that is, its ‘actor-centredness’, was not as useful in 
erecting the MLG construction (i.e. to say what MLG was)”.   
36 For an overview of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, see Cini (2007a) and Bache and George (2006; 2007a). 
For selected pioneering works, see Haas (1958) and Moravcsik (1993). Furthermore, it might have been possible to use 
aspects of organisation theory to provide assumptions about institutional behaviour in general. However, considering how 
different the three institutions in question are (the units of analysis in the Commission are bureaucrats, the Council consists 
of member state representatives and the Parliament consists of politicians), it has been considered more appropriate to use 
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According to neo-functionalism, the European Commission is expected to act as a 
political entrepreneur and a mediator (Cf. Jensen 2007; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). 
The ultimate aim of the Commission is to push the member states towards greater 
cooperation, leading to ever increasing supranational decision-making. The 
Commission can thus be expected to behave in a proactive and ambitious manner 
concerning the Arctic Policy. The European Parliament is considered an ally to the 
Commission; although consisting of nationally elected MEPs (Member of the 
European Parliament), it is expected to develop loyalties towards the EU and thus 
defend the European interest against national governments. The Parliament is thus 
also expected to favour a coherent and ambitious Arctic policy. It might thus also be 
possible to imagine that the Commission and the Parliament would pursue rather 
coherent approaches towards the Arctic. Concerning the Council, it is the institution 
where national interests are defended. It is therefore likely to be more cautious of an 
ambitious EU Arctic policy that could compromise national influence and authority, 
for example by including issues which are currently wholly or partly member state 
competence or issues which are perceived as nationally sensitive. However, neo-
functionalism believes that national governments cannot manage to completely resist 
further pressures for integration.  
Conversely, variants of intergovernmentalism consider the member states to be by far 
the most important actors; European cooperation involves at most sharing of 
sovereignty rather than any transfer of sovereignty from the national to supranational 
level (Cf. Cini 2007b). When the states find it in their interest to give certain 
regulatory functions to supranational institutions, they do so in order to make 
cooperation more effective. In fact, the intergovernmentalist view of the 
supranational institutions is that they are little more than the servants of the member 
states without being capable of playing an independent role within the process. 
According to such a view, the Commission and the Parliament do not really have that 
                                                                                                                                           
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, although the two theories have had to be conceptually stretched a little in 
order to also cover intra-institutional dynamics.  
 
 28 
much influence over the policy process and the EU Arctic Policy will not be any 
more ambitious than is accepted by the member states.  
In order to assess inter-institutional relations, it is also necessary to have some 
knowledge about intra-institutional relations, or internal dynamics. Internal forces 
might influence on the institution’s external behaviour and its actions towards Arctic 
issues. In this regard, as will be discussed in more detail in the section about 
coherence, the institutions are not assumed to be unitary actors but rather expected to 
face internal divisions Christiansen (2001: 750). According to the neo-functionalist 
line of thought, it is possible to assume that components within the Commission and 
the Parliament, given that they are representing the interests of the Union, would be 
more internally coherent than the Council. The components of the Council, in line 
with intergovernmentalist ideas, represent national interests and should thus display 
more internal diversity.   
In sum, the main contribution of MLG to studies of European foreign policy is that it 
looks at how the EU’s governance system affects its capacity to act towards the 
external environment. The most important assumptions that can be derived from the 
above section are the following: Firstly, European policy-making involves more than 
one level and one set of actors; thus, developing an EU Arctic policy will involve the 
member states, i.e. the national level, on the one hand, and the Commission and the 
Parliament, i.e. the supranational level on the other. Secondly, the three institutions 
will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which might 
translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. Since in 
practice the Union strikes a balance between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism, there will be varying degrees of supranational and 
intergovernmental elements and tensions depending on the particular Arctic issue at 
hand.37 More specifically, these elements of integration and intergovernmentalism 
                                              
37 The “grand” debate in European studies is about whether the EU is, or should be, characterised by supranationalism or 
intergovernmentalism. The following definition of supranationalism is worth quoting in full; “Supranationalism is a method 
of decision-making in international organizations, where power is held by independent appointed officials or by 
representatives elected by the legislatures or people of the member states. Member-state governments still have power, but 
they must share this power with other actors. Furthermore, decisions tend to be made by majority votes, hence it is possible 
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imply that while the Commission is considered to act as a political entrepreneur, 
attempting to push forward with ever more integration in alliance with the European 
Parliament, the Council represents the intergovernmental aspects of European policy-
making, supposed to safeguard national interests from too much integration. 
Furthermore, while a certain level of internal fragmentation might be expected within 
the three institutions, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism lead to assuming a 
greater level of internal coherence in the supranational institutions than in the 
Council. Hence the second assumption about possible challenges to a coherent 
institutional approach to the Arctic. The final part of this chapter will present the 
structuring concept of the thesis, namely the concept of coherence in foreign policy.  
2.2.3 Coherence in European foreign policy-making 
The aim of this thesis is not to assess the effect of coherence in EFP on the EU’s 
ability to influence developments in the Arctic. Moreover, the EU cannot really be 
considered state-like actor. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the rationale 
underpinning the concept of coherence in foreign policy is that it is a prerequisite for 
the ability of a state to assert influence abroad and protecting itself from unwanted 
influence at home (Ekengren and Sundelius 2004: 110). Put slightly differently, 
coherence is regarded as a necessary tool to achieve effectiveness in foreign policy 
outcomes (Portela and Raube 2009: 2). Moreover, as stated earlier, coherence has a 
particular meaning when it comes to European foreign policy, being both a political 
requirement and a source of concern to policy-makers and academics alike. However, 
there is not one definition of coherence and consistency, nor a single manner in which 
to employ it. Rather than accounting for the entire conceptual debate, consistency and 
coherence will be briefly discussed, defined and adjusted according to the purpose of 
this study. Whereas the two terms will be used interchangeably in the following 
                                                                                                                                           
for a member-state to be forced by the other member states to implement a decision against its will; however, unlike a 
federal state, member states fully retain their sovereignty and participate voluntarily” (Leal-Arcas 2006: 5).  
Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, is a method of decision-making in international organisations where member 
states retain the power and decide by unanimity. If the governments appoint independent representatives, they will only 
have advisory or implementational roles. As a theory of European integration, Intergovernmentalism is situated in 
opposition to neo-functionalism, the latter which is often considered to have a supranational ambition. 
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section, “coherence” will be the preferred term throughout the rest of the paper for 
the sake of clarity.  
Often, whereas consistency refers to the absence of contradiction, coherence relates 
to the creation of synergies, added value or the construction of a united whole 
(Gauttier 2004: 23; Hillion 2008: 14; Missiroli 2001: 4). While consistency is quite 
straightforward to measure considering that a policy is either coherent or not, “it is 
quite conceivable that something is more or less coherent” (Missiroli 2001: 4). This 
thesis does not aim to assess coherence in absolute terms. Rather, the latter is used as 
a synonym for consistency and constitutes a structuring analytical tool with which to 
discuss challenges and opportunities in the EU’s approach to the Arctic. It denotes 
both “absence of contradiction” and, to a greater extent, “synergies” and a “united 
whole”. As Missiroli (2001: 4) argues, from a political and functional point of view, 
the difference between the two terms may not be so significant. Both concepts “hint 
at the need for coordinated policies with the goal of ensuring that the EU acts 
unitarily: all the more so when they refer to the Union’s external activities, which are 
inherently inter-pillar”.  
According to Christiansen (2001: 747), consistency may be understood in terms of 
systemic outputs, meaning the way in which the content of different policies 
produced by the EU forms part of a coherent whole. Or, it may be regarded in terms 
of the institutional process by which policies are made i.e. in terms of the degree to 
which institutions operate a coherent and coordinated process of deliberation and 
decision-making. Since there is not yet an outcome to study, and since it is possible to 
imagine that challenges in the process might influence a policy outcome, the main 
focus of this thesis is on the policy process itself. Furthermore, Simon Nuttall (2005: 
97) delineates three dimensions of coherence.38 Firstly, horizontal coherence refers to 
a lack of consistency between policies formulated across the EU’s policy-making 
system and particularly across policies developed through the various pillars. A 
possible example of horizontal inconsistency could be if the EU environmental policy 
                                              
38 See also, Duke (1999: 30) 
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in the future called for the protection of the Arctic, while its external energy policy 
ensured oil supply from a very polluting source in the Arctic Ocean. Achieving 
horizontal coherence would be desirable for efficient policy making and for the 
credibility of the EU as an actor in international politics. However, considering the 
number of different policy issues that are Arctic relevant, both within and across 
pillars, this could turn out a challenging task. Due to lack of space, however, 
horizontal consistency, will not be devoted much attention. Secondly, institutional 
coherence is related to the above category and denotes the problem which may arise 
because the EU has chosen to handle the single policy sector of external relations by 
two sets of actors that approach the same problem with different procedures. 
Christiansen (2001: 748) adds a second category, intra-institutional coherence, 
regarding the possibilities for internal fragmentation. The Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament are frequently considered to be unitary actors. However, 
according to Christiansen (2001: 750) “all three institutions face numerous internal 
divisions. Depending on their seriousness, such divisions may translate into 
fragmented policy-making and thus undermine the coherence of EU governance”. 
Considering the above, it is thus possible to imagine potential differences, or even 
divergences, in how the institutions approach Arctic issues as undermining a coherent 
Arctic approach. Finally, vertical consistency is jeopardised if member states pursue 
national policies which are out of kilter with the policies agreed in the EU. Vertical 
consistency is ultimately about “how far the member states are prepared to bind their 
national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP or the EU’s other external 
relations policies, thereby strengthening the EU’s position as a force in international 
diplomacy” (Nuttall 2005: 106). Vertical inconsistency could potentially display itself 
if some member states found it impossible to follow an agreed course in the EU’s 
approach to the Arctic. For example, the fact that the UK and the Netherlands voted 
against an agreed common EU position on the proposed ban on blue fin tuna in April 
this year, thus risking being called to court by the Commission, would arguably 
constitute an example of vertical incoherence which may undermine common EU 
approaches and the perception of the EU as a coherent actor in international politics 
(Cf. Hickman 2009; Rankin 2010).  
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Thus, to summarise, firstly, for the purpose of this thesis, coherence is understood in 
terms of the institutional process by which policies are made and is defined as the 
degree to which the institutions operate a coherent and coordinated process of 
deliberation and decision-making. Secondly, institutional coherence is the main focus 
of attention; however aspects of horizontal and vertical consistency will be referred 
to. The former denotes consistency between policies formulated across the EU’s 
policy-making system. The latter is interpreted as how far the member states are 
prepared to bind their national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP or the 
EU’s other external relations policies. Given that the three categories seem to be 
interconnected, it does not seem fruitful to analyse the different categories in total 
isolation. For example, as will be argued in chapter five, intra-institutional dynamics 
in the Council affects both institutional consistency while also representing potential 
challenges for vertical consistency. Thirdly, as internal dynamics might influence the 
approaches of the institutions towards the Arctic, intra-institutional coherence 
concerning possibilities for internal fragmentation is also considered.  
2.2.4 Implications of theory: Premises and assumptions 
As stated earlier in this chapter, this thesis analyses a policy in the making. It is thus 
difficult to identify specific aspects of the Arctic policy that can be accurately 
measured. Consequently, rather than focusing on one issue or one institution, 
questions and assumptions will necessarily be general in nature. The aim is to analyse 
the challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent EU 
Arctic policy by focusing on institutional coherence, guided by the analytical 
framework outlined above.   
The thesis is guided by two underlying premises derived from FPA and aspects of the 
literature on EFP. Firstly, the EU should not be considered a unitary actor, or state 
when developing an Arctic Policy. Rather it is a multilayered policy system subject to 
increasing transnational governance. Secondly, EU foreign policy is more than the 
formal institutions and outcomes of the CFSP, thus requiring a broad definition of 
EU foreign policy and a more holistic analysis of the actors and the policy process. 
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More importantly, the theoretical framework has provided two assumptions about 
actors and the policy process. Firstly, according to MLG, all three institutions; the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament have roles and powers in the Arctic 
policy-process. The claim will be assessed by looking at the nature of Arctic issues 
and to which of the institutions’ competence they are likely to fall. The intention is 
not to either verify or falsify the claim. This would not be possible by only looking at 
the issue of formal competences as there are many other ways that the institutions 
might have influence and powers over the policy-process. Nevertheless, assessing to 
what extent the three institutions have formal influence in the policy-process provides 
a relevant way to address the MLG theoretical assumption while at the same time 
providing important empirical information about the nature of the Arctic Policy. 
Secondly, the three institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic 
issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional 
approach to the Arctic. These differences will presumable be a result of the different 
nature and purpose of the institutions according to whether they are characterised as 
supranational or intergovernmental. The institutions will have different internal 
dynamics and ambitions, both of which might have an impact on the inter-
institutional relationship concerning Arctic issues. Firstly, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism imply that while the Commission is a political entrepreneur, 
attempting to push forward with ever more integration in alliance with the European 
Parliament, the Council represents the intergovernmental aspects of European policy-
making, supposed to safeguard national interests from too much integration. In other 
words, while the supranational institutions are perceived to be the accelerator, the 
Council is the breaks. The Council is expected to be particularly sceptical to issues 
concerning foreign policy in pillar two or towards increasing Commission 
competences in areas considered member state domains. Secondly, according to the 
literature on intra-institutional coherence it is assumed that the EU institutions face 
internal divisions. However, based on the two abovementioned theories a greater 
amount of coherence is expected within the Commission and the Parliament than 
within the Council when it comes to the content of the Arctic Policy and the 
ambitions concerning an EU role in Arctic matters. While the supranational 
 34 
institutions could be considered to have an “overarching agenda” which would 
constitute an incentive for cooperation, the Council is composed of 27 national 
governments that, although always attempting to reach consensus, nevertheless must 
defend the national interest. In sum, due to the factors above, the second assumption 
states that there will be a certain level of contrast between the institutions’ approaches 
to the Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent 
institutional approach to the Arctic.  
The aim of this chapter was to present an analytical framework for studying the EU 
Arctic Policy. To this end, four specific steps have been taken; firstly, FPA has been 
adopted and applied to European foreign policy; secondly, arguments have been 
presented for why a MLG perspective is the appropriate theoretical perspective; 
thirdly, elements of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been 
introduced; and lastly, the structuring concept of coherence has been presented, 
defined and explained. The structured framework here presented should facilitate the 
understanding of the different aspects of the analysis to follow.    
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3. EU policy-making and the nature of Arctic issues 
This chapter will assess the MLG assumption that all three institutions are central to 
developing a coherent EU approach to the Arctic. Assessing the roles of the 
institutions will provide important information about the current and future policy-
process. One way to proceed is to investigate the nature of Arctic issues in order to 
assess the formal influence of the institutions in the decision-making process. 
According to MLG, the institutions will have varying degrees of power based on the 
policy issue at hand. If Arctic issues are first and foremost CFPS issues, then the roles 
of the Commission and the Parliament will be significantly reduced. However, if the 
Arctic Policy is about pillar one external relations issues, or even internal issues, then 
the two supranational institutions have more influence, and the power of the Council 
is correspondingly weakened from deciding by unanimity to deciding by qualified 
majority voting. Such an assessment is, of course, not sufficient; institutions have 
other forms of influence than just decision-making powers. However, the above 
assessment nevertheless provides one useful way in which to study the roles of the 
institutions in developing an EU Arctic policy. Before discussing the nature of Arctic 
issues, however, it is necessary to briefly present the main actors in the EU policy-
process here deemed relevant, namely the Council of the European Union, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament as well as their roles, 
competences and influences in the general EU policy process.39 The second half of 
the chapter will then discuss the place of Arctic issues in the EU policy process, 
something which will provide knowledge about the roles of the different institutions 
in an EU Arctic policy.  
                                              
39 Using the term ‘actor’ opens up for a debate about who participates and influence European policy-making. It is, of 
course, not only the Council, the Commission and the Parliament that are relevant and important actors. Indeed, it is 
common in the EU to consult a variety of stakeholders. However, considering how little the process has evolved, it makes 
sense to look at the main institutions only as others actors will not be fully associated until a later stage such as if the 
Commission  decides to produce a Green Paper on the Arctic. Furthermore, although the former High Representative for 
CFSP and the Council Secretariat, and the new High Representative and the new European External Action Service played 
and are playing an important role in EU foreign policy, they will not be analysed separately as their contribution towards 
the Arctic Policy has thus far been limited compared to the other institutions.     
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3.1 EU politics: Actors and policy process 
3.1.1 Main actors in the European policy process 
Irrespective of theory, the main decision-making body of the EU is the Council of the 
European Union representing the member states (Cf. Council of the European Union 
Website). It is composed of ministers from national governments who currently meet 
in ten different configurations depending on the nature of the issues in question. For 
example, when the Council presented its Conclusions on the Arctic in December 
2009, the document was drafted by the Foreign Affairs Council, consisting of the 27 
foreign ministers.40 In practice, the Council in effect consists of a pyramid of 
meetings between permanent representatives and delegates of the member states, 
from working expert to ministerial level. The main coordinator is COREPER (the 
Permanent Representatives Committee) but the work of this Committee is itself 
prepared by more than 150 committees and working groups. For example, the 
Council Conclusions on the Arctic in 2009 was drafted by COEST, the Working 
Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Informant B; Respondent H).41 
Furthermore, the Council is both an executive and a legislator, sharing such powers 
with the Commission and the Parliament respectively. It is the forum for negotiating 
and legislating on traditional Community issues, but also the main institution for 
discussing and deciding on “intergovernmental” issues related to the CFSP, European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 1).42 The Council thus embodies the intergovernmental 
aspects of European policy-making.  
The second institution, in the words of Morten Egeberg (2007: 140), “is to many 
observers […] a unique institution. It is much more than an international secretariat, 
but not quite a government”. Simply put, the Commission is composed of one 
                                              
40 The Lisbon Treaty split what used to the General Affairs and External Relations Council into two councils; the Foreign 
Affairs Council and the General Affairs Council.  
41 The working groups are the last actual arbiters of Council negotiations of 70 per cent of the Council’s legislative output 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 14). 
42 After the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESDP is called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).   
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Commissioner from each of the 27 member states, nominated by national 
governments. In addition, the Commission has a permanent civil service of 
approximately 38, 000 staff (European Commission Website).43  The Commission 
has thus both a political executive wing providing political direction, notably the 
Commissioners, and an administrative wing; the civil service, which is divided into 
different Directorate General (DGs) that correspond to the national civil servant 
departments of state (Bache and George 2006: 261; Egeberg 2007: 140). An 
important feature of the Commission is that the Commissioners should be 
“completely independent in the performance of their duties [meaning] that they 
neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body” 
(European Commission 2007a: 2). Rather than advancing any particular national 
agenda, the role of the European Commission is to represent and uphold the interests 
of Europe as a whole by advancing the overall agenda. The extent to which the 
Commissioners are totally independent from their member state, is debated, however, 
addressing this issue is outside the scope of this paper (Cf. Egeberg 2006). The 
Commission presents proposals for European law, oversees the correct 
implementation of the Treaties and of legislation and carries out common policies as 
well as managing funds (European Commission 2007a: 2). Bearing in mind the 
debate about the independence of Commissioners, the Commission represents the 
supranational aspects of EU policy-making.  
Finally, the European Parliament is the only directly elected European institution. It 
currently (2010) consists of 736 MEPs, divided between the member states on a basis 
that is approximately proportionate with the size of the population (Bache and George 
2006: 295). The MEPs are nationally elected and their party delegations join together 
in multi-national party groups in the Parliament, based broadly around political 
ideology (Scully 2007: 180). Assessing the extent to which the MEPs vote along 
party lines or according to nationality is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say 
that the Parliament, according to authors, such as Roger Scully (2007: 177) has 
                                              
43 As of 2010. 
 38 
proven a strong advocate for closer European integration and more powers for itself.44  
The Parliament has currently twenty standing committees to prepare work for plenary 
sittings, divided into sectors such as foreign affairs, international trade and 
development. They undertake legislative work such as scrutinizing draft legislation 
and drawing up amendments. The committee system as a whole is widely regarded as 
the place where most of the Parliament’s serious work is done (Scully 2007: 182). 
Originally only a consultative body, the Parliament’s powers have increased 
substantially over the years, now including political, legislative and budgetary powers 
(Cf. European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication 2009). It is a key 
player in the process of making Community law, co-deciding with the Council on 
budgetary issues, on laws related to the freedom of movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital within the EU and on matters such as environmental protection. 
Its assent is required for any international treaty the EU signs up to as well as for any 
enlargement of the EU. Bearing in mind the debate about whether the Parliament 
represents national interests or the Union’s interests, it is regarded as a supranational 
institution in EU policy-making.  
To sum up, the three most important actors in European policy-making are the 
Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The institutions have different roles and 
powers in the process depending both on the issue in question. Whereas the first 
represents intergovernmental aspects of EU policy-making and integration, the two 
other are often considered supranational institutions, meant to advocate the Union’s 
interests and advancing integration and cooperation.  
3.1.2 Institutional competences in European policy-making 
Although the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the pillar structure when it entered 
into force in December 2009, there are two reasons why this thesis still refers to the 
pillar concept when discussing the role and powers of the different EU institutions in 
                                              
44 Some authors, such as Scully (2007: 180; 183) argue that although the unity of a party group is often the result of 
compromises among different national viewpoints differences within the Parliament are structured far more often along 
party lines than national ones. Others, however, such as Bache and George (2006: 307) maintain that the Parliament is still 
dominated by national parties and that this constrains the MEPs from acting independently. 
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European foreign policy-making: Firstly, the new competence arrangements are still 
being debated as of May 2010; and, secondly, the focus of this thesis covers the last 
three years, two and a half of which were before the Lisbon Treaty. However, 
considering the Treaty’s significance for the future process towards an Arctic policy, 
the possible implications of the Treaty for an EU Arctic policy will be briefly 
addressed.  
According to MLG, there will be varying degrees of supranational and 
intergovernmental elements depending on the Arctic issue at hand. While some of 
these policy areas belong to the sphere where the Commission and the Parliament 
have a significant amount of influence others are more intergovernmental in nature. 
From the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in late 
2009, the EU legally consisted of three pillars, meaning that the roles and powers of 
the institutions depended on the policy area (Cf.Gateway to the European Union: 
Europa Glossary).45 The first pillar was the only pillar with a legal personality and 
represented supranational cooperation on matter such as agriculture, environmental 
law, trade, energy, research and the EU’s economic relations with third countries 
(European Navigator). Concerning matters within this pillar, only the Commission 
could submit proposals for legislation to the Council and the Parliament, and a 
qualified majority in the Council was sufficient for an act to be adopted. The 
European Parliament was actively involved through the co-decision procedure 
covering most policy areas (Gateway to the European Union: Summaries of EU 
legislation). This gave the Commission and the Parliament considerable powers vis-à-
vis the Council.   
The second pillar contained the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the 
third pillar was devoted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (JHA). 
These two pillars essentially designated intergovernmental cooperation between 
governments, functioning according to the intergovernmental procedure where the 
Commission shared the right of initiative with the member states, and unanimity in 
                                              
45 See Appendix i for a schematic overview of institutional competences before and after the Lisbon Treaty.  
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the Council was generally necessary to adopt a decision, with the Parliament only 
enjoying a purely consultative role. The Commission was “fully associated with all 
aspects of the CFSP” meaning that it was represented at meetings of CFSP at all 
levels, from Council to the working groups (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 175). 
Furthermore, the economic means used in the conduct of foreign policy concerning 
issues such as financial assistance, embargoes and trade negotiations still lied within 
its responsibility (European Navigator). As for the Parliament, it was consulted, kept 
regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission about developments 
concerning the CFSP and could make recommendations to the Council. The 
Commission and the Parliament thus still played a role in foreign policy making, but 
it was significantly reduced, with the member states being at the hub of decision-
making (Gateway to the European Union: Summaries of EU legislation). The pillar 
structure and the nature of competences were (and will be- the arrangements are still 
not settled as of May 2010) altered with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty last 
year. European policy-making will still be divided between the institutions. However, 
considering that some of the treaty changes are highly relevant to this study, the paper 
devotes a section to the Treaty’s main features.  
3.1.3 Implications of the Lisbon Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1st 2009 (Cf. Fondation Robert 
Schuman 2009; Gateway to the European Union: The Lisbon Treaty). It removes the 
pillar structure and makes the Union into one legal entity with three categories of 
power: Firstly, exclusive powers where only the Union may legislate including policy 
areas such as the common trade policy; secondly, shared powers where the states 
may legislate on matters on which the Union has not made any legislation; and, 
thirdly, supporting competence where the Union may only support action by the 
member states such as for example providing funding.46  
                                              
46 Before the Lisbon Treaty, the first pillar with community issues, was called the European Community (EC) and was the 
only entity with a legal personality in the EU. Considering that the Union in its entirety became a legal personality with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the term EC has been replaced with EU.   
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Other potentially relevant changes for the development of an EU Arctic policy 
include the increase in Parliament power and the new European External Action 
Service (EEAS). Firstly, the “co-decision procedure” has been renamed the “ordinary 
legislative procedure” and has been extended to several new fields where the 
Parliament before was only consulted or not involved at all. The Parliament now 
determines all expenditure together with the Council. In addition, its assent is 
henceforth required for all international agreements concluded in fields governed by 
the ordinary legislative procedure. The abovementioned changes provide a solid 
argument for why the Parliament must be taken into account when analysing the 
process towards an EU Arctic policy. In this regard, the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty seems to increase the relevance of MLG as a theoretical approach to European 
policy-making. 
Secondly, the new post of High Representative (HR) coordinates and represents the 
Union's CFSP. It wears “two hats”, being based in the European Commission but also 
chairing the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Union. The European External 
Action Service (EEAS) is in the process of being created and will serve under the HR 
as essentially a foreign ministry for the Union. The potential impact of the EEAS on 
the Arctic Policy was highlighted by several of the respondents interviewed for this 
study: Will there be competition or cooperation between the EEAS and the 
Commission on the Arctic Policy? Will DG Transport or EEAS take charge on issues 
related to transport in the Arctic Ocean? (Respondent F). How will the Lisbon Treaty 
affect the powers of the three institutions in general and foreign policy-making? 
Although an important topic, the main aim of this thesis is not to discuss the 
implications that the Lisbon Treaty will have on the EU Arctic Policy.  
In sum, as has been demonstrated in the section above, the European institutions have 
different powers depending on the policy issues in question. Thus if Arctic issues are 
first and foremost CFPS issues, the roles of the Commission and the Parliament will 
be significantly reduced. However, if the Arctic Policy is about pillar one issues, or 
even internal issues, then the two supranational institutions have more influence, and 
the power of the Council is correspondingly weakened from deciding by unanimity to 
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deciding by qualified majority voting. It is important to note, however, that although 
the pillar structure helps appreciating the complex structure of EU policy-making, 
changes in the relationship between the pillars throughout the 1990s has made the 
boundaries between them blurred (Phinnemore 2007: 34). It is therefore difficult to 
accurately measure the role and the power of the institutions in EU policy-making, all 
the more so considering that the EU is currently moving from the old arrangements 
towards the new era of the Lisbon Treaty with the new structures still being debated. 
The next section debates the cross-pillar nature of Arctic issues. It addresses the MLG 
assumption that all three institutions have influence and power over Arctic issues by 
looking at their formal influence based on decision-making powers and the 
competence arrangements.  
3.2 The nature of Arctic issues 
Debating whether the EU Arctic Policy concerns Community or member-state policy, 
and to whose authority it falls, is a difficult task, and could constitute a research topic 
in itself. An initial observation suggests that Arctic issues at least concern matters 
which are external to the Union; the Arctic region and the Arctic Ocean is not 
European territory to the same extent as for example the Baltic Sea region.47 As a 
Danish EU official said, although emphasising that he was exaggerating; “it is just 
like an EU Latin-America Policy” (Respondent H). Furthermore, according to one 
Commission official, RELEX and External Affairs in the Council are taking the lead 
on the Arctic (Respondent A). It is worth noting that it was the Foreign Affairs 
Council that came with the Council Conclusions on the Arctic both in 2008 and 2009, 
rather than the General Affairs Council or environment or transport and energy. It is 
also DG RELEX that is in charge of the further work on the Arctic in the 
Commission, rather than DG MARE or DG ENV. In addition, the European 
Parliament also labels Arctic issues external relations and CFSP (European 
                                              
47 Even this, of course, is disputed. On the one hand, the Commission  argues that the EU indeed has territories in the 
Arctic, pointing to Denmark (Greenland), Sweden and Finland (Cf. European Commission 2008e) On the other hand, others 
point to the fact that Greenland is the only EU territory with a coastal line in the Arctic and that the island has extensive 
type of self-government from Denmark and withdrew its EU membership in 1985 (Folketinget Webpage).  
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Parliament 2010b). However, a part from this observation, the question about the 
nature of the Arctic Policy becomes more complicated. Is the Arctic Policy a 
Commission policy, comprising internal or external relations in pillar one? Or is it a 
member-state policy subject to the decision-making procedure of the second pillar 
where the Council remains considerably more powerful than the Commission and the 
Parliament? Some informants and respondents interviewed in this study claimed that 
it is foreign policy referring to the CFSP. Others claimed it is first and foremost a 
Commission policy comprising pillar one issues. Yet others concluded that it is 
probably both and that it is too soon to know what, if any, parts of the Arctic Policy 
would fall within member state competences and what parts would fall to the 
Commission. Assessing the nature of Arctic issues is important for determining the 
formal influence of the institutions in the process towards an Arctic policy.  
3.2.1 Member-state or Commission domain? 
On the one hand, there are factors suggesting that Arctic matters are the domain of 
member-states and the Council, thus reducing the relevance of the Commission and 
the Parliament. One former Norwegian diplomat to the EU believes that a coherent 
EU Arctic Policy will be first and foremost a CFSP matter, which is ultimately 
decided by the member-states (Informant B). Indeed, one of the first official 
documents that mentioned the Arctic was the paper from the High Representative for 
CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for external relations, Ms. Benito 
Ferrero-Waldner, to the Council in 2008. Apparently, what might have sparked Mr. 
Solana’s interest in the Arctic was the energy crisis that hit Europe, first, in 2006, 
then again in 2007 (Informant B; Cf. Euractive 2006; RT 2008). The Russian shut-
down of gas supplies to Europe amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU when 
it comes to security of supply. The main concern of the paper was the impact of 
climate change on international security and that the geo-strategic dynamics of the 
region were changing with “potential consequences for international stability and 
European security interests” (European Commission and the High Representative for 
the CFSP 2008: 8). However, the document also mentioned energy security. As one 
Norwegian regional government official working in Brussels put it; “If you choose to 
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wear realpolitikal glasses, it is ultimately about energy security” (Informant D). With 
“energy security [being] a major objective of the European Union to ensure its 
economic development and the well-being of its citizens”, the EU has an interest in 
the continued delivery from the Russia and Norway (European Commission 2008b: 
19).48 However, as one Norwegian diplomat to the EU pointed out; “many people in 
the Parliament are concerned about energy security, but this is a member-state area of 
competence […] Security is a classic foreign policy issue” (Informant C). Thus, 
potentially Arctic relevant foreign policy areas concern various aspects of security, a 
clear example of Council competence.49  
On the other hand, however, it might be argued that the Arctic Policy ultimately is 
about internal and external EU policies and actions, falling within pillar one where 
the influence of the supranational institutions are greater and where the power of the 
Council is somewhat less significant. Indeed, most policy areas currently mentioned 
in relation to a future EU Arctic policy and most of the current Arctic relevant EU 
policies are Commission policies. The EU policy sector which most directly targets 
the Arctic region is the EU’s research policy. According to the Commission’s 
Communication (2008e: 5) the past Community Framework Programmes (FP5 and 
FP6) provided support to more than 50 polar-related projects. The EU is thus the 
biggest single contributor to Arctic-related research in areas such as climate change, 
rising sea-levels and Arctic and boreal ecosystems (Borg 2009). Other Arctic relevant 
Commission policies include fisheries, tourism and partly environment (Cf. Airoldi 
2008). Furthermore, although difficult to evaluate their direct relevance for the 
Arctic, the EU has various programmes within its cohesion policy that specifically 
target regions in the northernmost regions of the EU. These programmes are financed 
by the European Regional Development Fund or the European Neighbourhood Policy 
                                              
48 In 2020, with "business as usual" the EU's energy import dependence will jump from 54% of total EU energy 
consumption in 2008 to 65% in 2030 (European Commission 2007b: 3; Eurostat 2008). In 2008, the EU produced less than 
one fifth of its total oil consumption, with 33 % of oil imports coming from Russia and 16% from Norway (European 
Commission 2008b: 9). Concerning gas, the EU produces about two fifths of consumption needs with gas the gas imported 
is coming from four big suppliers with Russia providing 42% and Norway accounting for 24%.  
49 Note that the abovementioned factors provide merely tentative indications as to the CFSP foreign policy nature of Arctic 
issues and by no means represent an exhaustive analysis.  At such an early stage in the policy process, it is not likely that 
the member states have fully developed positions on Arctic issues.  
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Instrument. In addition, Greenland, is considered an OCT (Overseas Countries and 
Territories) associated to the EU and receives a considerable amount of EU financial 
support (Informant A; European Commission Website). Thus, an EU Arctic policy 
will include several policies areas over which the Commission has influence.  
3.2.2 The mixed nature of the EU Arctic Policy 
As indicated above, Arctic issues may seem to concern both matters falling within 
CFSP i.e. member-state or Council competences and Community, i.e. Commission 
competences. This ultimately provides support for the MLG assumption that all three 
institutions matter, although they matter more or less considering the topic in 
question. Indeed, most interviewees believed Arctic issues to be mixed in nature and 
that this might potentially constituted a challenge to developing the policy.50 
According to a Norwegian diplomat to Brussels; an Arctic policy would to a large 
extent concern the relationship with third countries, something which is clearly within 
the Council competence. However, the diplomat believed that there are many 
exceptions, as demonstrated in the Commission Communication (Informant C). In a 
similar vein, a Commission official argued that the Arctic Policy is both a 
Commission and a member-state issue, and thus less of an exclusive Commission 
policy (Respondent A). This view was supported by other EU officials who pointed 
out that the issue of competences really depends on the topic. For example, matters 
related to fisheries are an exclusive Commission competence.  While environment 
and transport are mixed competence, meaning that both the Commission and 
member-states play a role, energy still belongs to the member-states’ domain 
(Respondent D; Respondent C; Respondent F). Indeed, as the Norwegian diplomat 
mentioned above noted; on the one hand the Commission’s Communication from 
2008 includes different proposals for action of which some are within the 
Commission competence, such for example research and environmental protection 
(Informant C). These proposals are relatively vague and not very controversial. The 
                                              
50 The issue of competences is particularly relevant in this regard as the EU will have to coordinate issues such as fisheries- 
a Commission policy and energy- a member state policy.  Although this issue could constitute a topic of research in itself, it 
will not be given much attention in the remaining part of the paper.   
 46 
Communication proposes for instance to assess the effectiveness of EU policies in 
responding to Arctic environmental challenges; reduce pollution of the Arctic, and 
develop further research programs and coordinate efforts in different research areas 
relevant to the Arctic such as environment, transport, and energy  (Cf. European 
Commission 2008e). On the other hand, the Communication also points to policy-
making in more controversial areas, which are outside the Commission’s competence, 
such as the governance issue. It claims that “the main problems relating to Arctic 
governance include the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of effective 
instruments […] and gaps in […] implementation and geographic scope”, suggesting 
that the EU should “assess the effectiveness of Arctic-relevant multilateral 
agreements to determine whether additional initiatives or measures are needed” 
(European Commission 2008e: 10-11). As will be discussed in more detail later in 
this paper, the issue of governance has proved a somewhat sensitive topic in the EU 
because the “Arctic Five”, including Denmark believe that the legal framework for 
Arctic issues is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
and they therefore see “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal 
regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (Informant A; Informant C; Respondent H; 
Arctic Ocean Conference 2008: 2). 
This chapter has addressed the MLG claim that all three institutions; the Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament, have formal powers in the process of developing an 
EU Arctic policy according to the nature of the Arctic issue in question. Although it 
is not possible at this stage to draw certain conclusions as to the nature of the Arctic 
Policy, preliminary findings nevertheless suggest that such a policy will be situated in 
the nexus between internal and external policies, and between external relations 
(pillar one) and CFSP (pillar two). The most important implication of the above for 
institutional coherence in the EU’s approach to the Arctic is that, in support of MLG, 
all three institutions matter and must be included in the analysis.51 An Arctic policy 
                                              
51 Firstly, a potential conceptual implication of the findings in this chapter is to support the view that it is not sufficient to 
define EU foreign policy as CFSP in the traditional sense. Rather, the foreign policy of the EU must thus be defined as the 
ensemble of the EU’s external activities, combining both the CFSP and the activities of the Commission, often referred to 
as the EU’s external relations, falling within pillar one. See Karen E. Smith (2003: 2) for a similar definition of European 
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will not only be a matter for the member states, but will also be influenced by the 
Commission and the Parliament, all the more so after the Lisbon treaty increased the 
Parliament’s powers. Furthermore, the fact that all three have a role to play might 
pose a challenge to institutional coherence in that they all need to agree on the role of 
the EU in the Arctic. Considering the different nature of the institutions, such a 
coherent approach cannot be taken for granted. The next two chapters will therefore 
study internal dynamics within the institutions as well as the relationship between 
them in order to address the issue of coherence in the EU’s approach to the Arctic.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
foreign policy. However, more academic attention is needed to policy areas with clear foreign policy or external relations 
relevance, but which also involve internal policies. Secondly, although the cross-pillar nature of Arctic issues is likely to 
pose challenges to developing an EU Arctic policy in terms of issues of competences and coordination, this is outside the 
scope of this paper.  
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4. The EU and the Arctic: Actors, actions, and 
internal dynamics 
In line with MLG, and as argued in the previous chapter, the Arctic is a cross-pillar 
policy issue that is not only CFPS related, but not only Commission relevant either. It 
is, in other words, a policy on which all three institutions have some form of 
influence and decision-making power. Considering that EU policy-making strikes a 
balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, it is assumed that there 
will be a certain level of contrast between the institutions’ approaches to the Arctic 
issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional 
approach to the Arctic. Since the internal dynamics of the institutions might influence 
their approaches and behaviour towards Arctic issues this chapter studies the internal 
dynamics and actions of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament respectively 
in relation to the Arctic Policy since 2007.52 It addresses the assumption derived from 
the literature on intra-institutional coherence about internal fragmentation within the 
institutions as well as the assumptions derived from neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism about the different behaviour and roles of the institutions.  
4.1 The European Commission 
According to neo-functionalism, the Commission is to be considered a political 
entrepreneur, striving to develop new policies and activities for the Union (Cf. Jensen 
2007; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). Although the Parliament also has pushed for an 
EU Arctic policy, there is no doubt that the Commission has been proactive in 
support of increased EU activity related to Arctic issues. As one Commission official 
pointed out, although there were individual MEPs in the Parliament involved in 
Arctic issues before 2008, “the first coherent policy document came from the 
Commission” (Respondent C).The Arctic as a policy area was first mentioned in its 
                                              
52 For the sake of clarity and space, the focus in the following analysis will be on the period since 2007 as a basis from 
which to make tentative projections about challenges and opportunities in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. The 
reason for this choice is that the call for an Arctic Policy first appeared, albeit implicitly, in an official document in 2007, 
namely in the Integrated Maritime Policy (Cf. European Commission 2007c). Note that it was the first call for an Arctic 
Policy in an official document, not the first call for a policy as such.  
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Integrated Maritime Policy in 2007 and in the Marine Strategy Directive, which was 
finalised in June 2008. However, it was the Paper on Climate Change and 
International Security published jointly in March 2008 by the High Representative at 
the time, Mr. Solana, and the Commissioner for external relations, Ms. Ferrero-
Waldner, that officially launched the idea of an EU policy for the Arctic (Cf. 
European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008). As 
mentioned in the introduction, the paper highlighted both challenges and 
opportunities in relation to developments in the region and explicitly called for a 
standalone policy.  
The Commission started working on the Communication in the spring of 2008 
(Informant B; Respondent A; Respondent D). There was no standalone department 
dealing with Arctic issues in the Commission, rather DG RELEX took the lead in 
close liaison with DG MARE and created an inter-service group including 
representatives from nine to twelve DGs of which the core group currently consists of 
DG RELEX; DG MARE; DG Research; DG ENV; DG CLIM (created in 2010), and 
DG MOVE (Informant B; Informant C; Respondent A; Respondent C; Respondent 
D).53 According to two Commission officials, DG RELEX took the real lead and did 
most of the drafting (Respondent A; Respondent D). With RELEX and MARE at the 
wheel, there was one direction towards foreign policy and another towards maritime 
policy. The Commissioners for RELEX and MARE in association with DG ENV 
presented the Commission’s Communication on the EU and the Arctic in November 
2008 (Cf. European Commission 2008e).54 The document was meant as a first layer 
of an Arctic policy for the European Union and set out EU interests and proposed 
action for EU Member States and institutions. It included three main policy 
objectives; firstly, protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population; 
                                              
53 According to Informant B there were seven DGs involved in the inter-service group that drafted the Communication in 
2008: DG RELEX, DG MARE, DG ENV, DG TREN, DG Research, DG Enterprise and AIDCO (the EuropeAid Co-
operation Office).  Respondent A believes there are currently 10-12 DGs in the inter-service group. Furthermore, note that 
Respondent D does no include DG CLIM in the core group and that Respondent A, contrary to the others, includes DG 
ENER.   
54 The next document which is expected from the Commission will be a status report on Arctic issues and is not due until 
2011.  
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secondly, promoting sustainable use of resources; and finally, contributing to 
enhanced Arctic multilateral governance. 
According to writings on intra-institutional coherence, the Commission should not be 
regarded as a unitary actor. Indeed, according to Christiansen (2001: 751), the “very 
nature of the Commission- a single institution encompassing large and relatively self-
contained DGs- is a recipe for fragmentation and internal division”. Although this 
thesis focuses on the DGs, i.e. the bureaucratic units, only, thus avoiding potential 
division between the bureaucratic and the political wing, a certain amount of inter DG 
divisions should therefore nevertheless be expected. Indeed, some of the interviewees 
believe that there was a certain amount of internal struggle within the Commission 
concerning the drafting process (Informant A; Informant B; Respondent F). 
According to a Norwegian government official, although there was not outright 
tension, there was great prestige associated with taking the lead, and there was a 
struggle for influence all the way (Informant A). The result was a compromise text 
where the representative for “user-interests” in the Arctic i.e. DG MARE and the 
“protectors” i.e. DG ENV achieved some of their objectives, while RELEX managed 
to include aspects of foreign policy (Informant A).55 Other Commission respondents, 
however, supported the idea of internal struggle to a lesser extent and believed that 
there was not much disagreement at all. According to one official, it was “fairly clear 
that it would be RELEX that would take the lead as it was RELEX that had looked 
after northern issues before” (Respondent D). Furthermore, there was supposedly 
little disagreement related to the content of the document; rather there was a question 
of adjusting details and wording (Respondent A; Respondent D).56   
In the end, the distance between the two abovementioned perceptions might not be so 
great after all. It is not surprising that institutions often experience a certain amount 
of internal fragmentation, or what Christansen (2001) might call threats to intra-
                                              
55 The term “user” refers to having an interest in exploiting the Arctic region in economical terms.  
56 Note that normally, before a Communication is adopted it is sent to an inter-service consultation and then, when 
approved, it is passed on to the Commissioners for approval. If there is disagreement at this level, the Communication will 
be discussed among the cabinets of the Commissioners concerned. It is unknown whether there was disagreement among 
the Commissioners during the approval of the 2008 Commmunication (Respondent D).     
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institutional coherence. While, according to neo-functionalism, the different DGs, in 
virtue of being part of a supranational institution, could arguably be expected to 
advocate integration and thus promote as extensive an Arctic policy as possible, they 
still represent different groups and interests within the Commission. Whereas DG 
ENV is supposed to look after the views of environmental groups within the Union, 
DG MARE represents “user interests”, e.g. the interests of fishermen, shipping 
companies and so fort. DG ENER would naturally be concerned with security of 
supply as the Arctic might become a future source of energy. As one EU official 
pointed out, the sectoral DGs have their own objectives to pursue, and although they 
might not go in totally opposite directions, it is the responsibility of RELEX to ensure 
coherence (Respondent B). Although a certain amount of internal division and 
competition among the different DGs must be expected, interviews with Commission 
officials nevertheless suggest that levels of incoherence are not that significant at this 
stage.  
Furthermore, there are indications suggesting that for the time being, the inter-service 
group cooperates in a relatively coherent manner. Of course, one should not 
underestimate the immense challenge related to horizontal coherence that the 
Commission will be facing in coordinating between the different sectors and policies, 
ranging from fisheries to tourism. As Alyson Bailes (2009) points out,  
The Commission's proposed strategy limits itself to eight main headings 
(environment, climate change, indigenous peoples, research, energy 
policy, sustainable exploitation, transport and tourism), but just addressing 
those would mean coordinating between dozens of different offices 
scattered through all the EU’s bodies. 
Yet, at such an early stage where the number of actors and agencies are still limited, 
preliminary findings, albeit based on limited data, suggest that the Commission works 
in a relatively coordinated manner in relation to Arctic issues. There are a limited and 
hence arguably acquainted number of people in the different DGs working on Arctic 
issues, sharing speeches and informing each other about policy positions (Respondent 
C). Furthermore, through the inter-service group, they share information, both 
formally and informally, and have pre-meetings in which they discuss agendas and 
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what positions the Commission should take before sending representatives to 
meetings and seminars on Arctic issues with other stakeholders (Respondent D). To 
sum up, there does not seem to be much internal fragmentation in the Commission’s 
work on Arctic issues even if this could be expected based on literature on intra-
institutional coherence. The DGs also seem to be taking measures to ensure that 
cooperation in a coordinated manner. A coherent approach at this stage of the policy-
process, however, is no guarantee against internal fragmentation as the process 
evolves and becomes more complex. Nevertheless, at this stage, preliminary findings 
suggest a relatively high level of internal coherence and coordination in the 
Commission. As will be argued below, the Council inhibits rather different internal 
dynamics. 
4.2 The Council and the member states 
Whereas the Commission, as stated in chapters two and three is a supranational 
institution meant to encourage ever more integration in the EU, the Council 
represents the interests of the national governments. It is therefore possible to expect 
the Council to have different internal dynamics, ambitions and objectives when it 
comes to an EU Arctic policy. Perhaps most importantly, since it is a far less 
internally coherent player than the Commission, it is presumably more challenging to 
achieve consensus on Arctic issues within the Council. Moreover, the Council is also 
expected to prevent the Commission from developing a too ambitious EU Arctic 
policy that would pose a risk to national authority.57 The differences in the nature and 
approaches of the two abovementioned institutions serve to illustrate the tensions 
between the supranational and the intergovernmental in the Union.   
The contribution of the Council towards an EU Arctic policy has been more modest 
than that of the Commission. As has been mentioned earlier in this paper, the High 
Representative, together with the Commission wrote a paper to the European Council 
                                              
57 Of course, there is great variation among the member states in terms of whether they favour more integration or less. 
Traditionally, whereas for example France and Germany have been seen as advocates of closer cooperation, other, such as 
the UK and Denmark have been considered more sceptical.  
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i.e. the heads of state in 2008, calling for an Arctic policy (Cf. European Commission 
and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008).58 That paper is the only official 
proposal presented by the Council concerning the policy. Since then, the Council has 
officially responded to a Commission proposal, which is a normal procedure. The 
Council gave a rather short response to the Communication in its Council 
Conclusions in December 2008, but provided a much more detailed response one 
year later (Cf. Conseil de l’Union Européenne 2008; Council of the European Union 
2009).  
The drafting of the Conclusions in 2009 was chaired by the Swedish Presidency (Cf. 
Swedish EU Presidency Website 2009). The Council working party responsible for 
Arctic issues is COEST, which did the actual drafting after receiving statements and 
comments from the other groups (Respondent H; Informant B). The document 
welcomed the gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues, presenting twenty-
three points in order to take a next step towards the formulation of an overarching 
approach to EU policy on Arctic issues (Cf. Council of the European Union 2009). 
With the Conclusions, the Council has played the ball back into the Commission’s 
court asking for a progress report to be submitted by 2011.  
Whereas the Commission has clearly demonstrated an interest in an Arctic policy for 
the Union, it is more difficult to assess how interested the Council as an institution is 
in seeing the EU develop such a policy. On the one hand, there does not seem to be 
much interest in the Arctic among member states as there are other topics that receive 
more attention. As a Norwegian regional government official working in Brussels 
bluntly put it; “the Arctic as an issue is not at the top of anyone’s agenda” (Informant 
D). On the other hand, another EU official, working for the Commission, claimed that 
the Arctic is very much of interest to the Council considering that three members are 
Arctic states, six members are observers to the Arctic Council and one member state, 
                                              
58 The post of the High Representative was meant to give the CFSP diplomatic weight and continuity. The position was 
combined with that of Secretary-General of the Council. The HR assisted the Presidency in formulating policy and he also 
acted on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties. Javier Solana held the post from it was 
created in 1997 until it was replaced by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with 
the Lisbon Treaty. The new post is currently held by Catherine Ashton.  
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Italy, has applied for such status (Respondent A; Cf. Arctic Council Website). In 
addition, the official pointed out that also other smaller states are interested, such as 
Estonia, which has run expeditions to Russian areas for years (Cf. Estonian Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2009; European Science Foundation 2010). Another EU official 
argued in a similar vein, claiming that the Arctic is “a hot issue”, obviously for the 
Arctic states, but also beyond, leaving just a small minority to remain indifferent 
(Respondent B). Yet a third EU representative, working for the Parliament, noted that 
even if a country is not particularly interested, such as Austria, it is nevertheless 
aware that in the EU, the member states have to make a deal (Respondent F).  
However, if the Council seems to express a certain level of interest for Arctic issues, 
this interest varies greatly within the institution, mostly due to inherent characteristics 
of the member states and their relationship with the Arctic region. Perhaps most 
importantly, member states have different status according to UNCLOS and the 
Arctic Council (AC). Denmark is an Arctic coastal state and hence enjoys particular 
rights and obligations according to UNCLOS. According to the Danish Foreign 
Policy Yearbook 2009, “the Arctic is likely to become an important new arena for 
Danish foreign policy, causing a considerable drain on resources” (Petersen 2009: 
10). As will be discussed below, Denmark is in a particular position when it comes to 
the EU Arctic Policy. Finland and Sweden, while being Arctic states without a coast 
bordering the Arctic Ocean and thus not affected by UNCLOS in their Arctic 
territories, they are also full members of the AC. Finland is about to finalise its own 
Arctic strategy and aims to get more involved in the Arctic (Respondent G; Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2010). The UK is a permanent observer to the AC, and 
has longstanding interests in the region. It has for years been engaged in the 
exploration, mapping and control of the Arctic region, the latter in which it continues 
to have economic, environmental and research interests (Archer 2010: 1; Global 
Biodiversity Sub-Committee 2008). Germany cooperates closely on energy with 
Norway and Russia and is also involved in Arctic research (Informant A; 
Utenriksdepartementet 2007). Furthermore, France, although having a minor 
presence in the region compared to Germany, has a long tradition of Arctic research 
and conducts some twenty research programs (Informant A; Gaudin 2007). It has 
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even appointed an ambassador to the Arctic, the former Prime Minister and MEP, Mr. 
Michel Rocard (Le Figaro 2009). In addition to the abovementioned member states 
the Netherlands, Spain and Poland are permanent observers to the Arctic Council 
(Arctic Council Website).59 Of the EU member states, the abovementioned arguably 
constitute a core group to which Arctic issues could be expected to be considered 
particularly relevant. In sum, it might therefore be argued that, although the Council 
has been less active than the Commission in promoting an Arctic policy, there are at 
least indications of a certain level of interest from some of the member states in the 
Council.60  
According to literature on intra-institutional coherence, the Council, similarly to the 
Commission, could be expected to face internal fragmentation. Moreover, adding the 
fact that it represents member states and the intergovernmental aspects of EU policy-
making, the potential for internal fragmentation might arguably be considered higher 
than in the Commission. Indeed, a Council interest in Arctic issues does not equal 
support. Support for an EU Arctic policy from the Council as an institution is not 
uniform and is influenced by the different member states relationships with the Arctic 
as well as their positions and interests. Although it is too soon to conduct an extensive 
study of member state interests and positions concerning Arctic issues, preliminary 
findings suggest that, as predicted by Christiansen (Cf. 2001) there are indications of 
some internal fragmentation within the Council. There seem to be strong national 
interests at play, or at least member state positions and responsibilities that the 
Council must take into account when deliberating upon the Arctic Policy and 
producing policy statements. Of course, it is important to note that the Council aims 
for consensus and attempts to avoid having to put matters to a vote (Cf. Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no 
incidents of disagreement or different positions before reaching a decision; internal 
differences that are likely to influence the final policy output and which may have 
implications for the institutional relationship in developing a coherent EU Arctic 
                                              
59 Italy has applied for permanent observer status.  
60 The reason for why the Council has not promoted an EU Arctic policy might also, of course, be due to other reasons, such 
as member states’ views and positions, something which will be discussed below.  
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policy. The section below provides a preliminary discussion of internal dynamics in 
the Council related to developing an EU Arctic policy.   
On the one hand, concerning the drafting of the Conclusions in 2009; “all 27 member 
states are on board and in favour of an Arctic policy as they supported the 
Conclusions” (Respondent D). After all, the final document could only contain points 
on which all states were able to agree. On the other hand, preliminary findings 
suggest that the drafting process in 2009 was characterised by, if not divisions, then at 
least strong positions and views. According to some interviewees, Denmark was quite 
proactive during the Council process in 2009 (Respondent G; Respondent H). 
Similarly to Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the latter holding the Presidency of the 
Council, were also engaged in the drafting process, albeit due to partly having Arctic 
territories, and not being costal states such as Denmark (Respondent G). Indeed, 
according to one EU official working for the Commission, the Arctic members wrote 
a large part of the Conclusions (Respondent C).  However, whereas one Commission 
official believed the Nordic countries to a large extent agreed during the discussions, 
another EU official, working for the Parliament, had the impression that Denmark 
had thought Sweden and Finland would be natural allies, something which turned out 
a mistaken belief (Respondent C; Respondent F).61  Indeed, whereas Finland and 
Sweden are said to have been generally positive to the Conclusions, Denmark is 
considered by many interviewees to have been somewhat cautious, aiming for a 
“suitable level of ambition” for the EU in the Arctic (Informant C; Respondent D; 
Respondent G; Respondent H). Two EU officials would even argue that Denmark is 
blocking the EU from taking any role in the Arctic due to fears over Greenland; 
others stated that Denmark was sceptical because it considers the EU a competitor 
and thus would like to limit the Commission’s competence (Respondent E; 
Respondent F; Respondent G). In fact, Denmark is in a quite particular situation 
something that could have implications for the content of the future EU Arctic policy 
                                              
61 Informant A believed that there is a division between Norway and Denmark on the one hand, and Sweden and Finland on 
the other, something which means there are limited possibilities for Nordic cooperation in the Arctic. Another informant 
(Informant C), did not know to what extent the Nordic countries have the same approach, but was of the opinion that the 
Nordic countries cannot be perceived as one bloc.  
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(Informant A; Respondent D; Respondent A). On the one hand, Demark, a member of 
the EU since 1973, would like to appear loyal to the EU as the latter brings the 
member state with its liberalised economy great benefits (Informant A). Indeed, in the 
preliminary Danish Arctic Strategy from 2008, it is stated that Denmark should work 
to ensure that the EU develops a standalone Arctic policy rather than a policy that is 
part of transport, energy, climate or fisheries policies (Udenrigsministeriet 2008: 6). 
On the other hand, there are several factors that complicate the relationship between 
Denmark and an EU Arctic policy. Firstly, Greenland poses challenges, particularly 
when it comes to Arctic issues. The island would like independence, and has its own 
oil and gas deposits (Cf. Telegraph 2009).62 If Denmark were perceived to defend 
Arctic coastal states on the issue of resources too eagerly, it risks upsetting 
Greenland. Secondly, being a coastal state and thus a “user” state, Denmark might 
have difficulties participating in an EU policy were it to emphasise protection over 
exploitation. For example, the strong EU promotion of protection of indigenous 
people’s rights is a sensitive issue as Denmark cannot provide the population on 
Greenland with indefinite rights (Informant A). Thirdly, and conversely, if the EU 
were to go too far in exploiting the Arctic, for example when it comes to fisheries, 
that would also constitute a problem to Denmark because of the need to protect 
Greenland fishing resources.  
According to a Norwegian government official with contacts in the Swedish 
Presidency, Sweden and Finland are in a different situation, arguably more likely to 
argue that the Arctic is a “common issue” within the EU (Informant A). However, 
due to limited data on Sweden’s position on Arctic issues, Finland receives more 
attention. Finland might have an incentive to making the Arctic a common policy, 
namely its powerful neighbour, Russia. In order to not having to confront northern 
issues alone, Finland might consider it preferable if the new High Representative, Ms. 
Catherine Ashton, fronted it (Informant C). According to two interviewees working 
                                              
62 Although purely speculations, it is worth noting that Greenland has begun a plan to reduce its financial dependence on 
Denmark, while still receiving as much money from the EU as if it were a region (Respondent A; Telegraph 2009). Some 
might consider it beneficial both for the island and for the EU if Greenland became totally independent and renegotiated a 
membership with the Union on different terms (Greenland voted to leave the EU in 1985).  
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for different institutions in the EU, Finland is actively seeking to obtain the planned 
Arctic information centre within the EU (Cf. Informant D; Respondent E; Barents 
Observer 2010). In fact, there are indications suggesting that Finland, about to 
finalise its own Arctic strategy, would like to see the Northern Dimension become the 
EU’s ticket of entry into the Arctic, rather than a new EU policy (Respondent E; 
Respondent G).63 The Northern Dimension, however, is very different from an EU 
policy. Whereas the latter allows to Union to pursue its objectives alone, the former is 
a common policy between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland where the EU is only 
one of four members (Respondent B). As one Commission official pointed out, 
however, Finland is not likely to be radical in its claims, as it takes a particular 
interest in the Northern Dimension, and would like to keep the latter on the EU 
agenda (Respondent A). Investigating such indications is outside the scope of this 
paper. Suffice to say that Finland and Sweden seem to have a somewhat less 
complicated approach to the Arctic and that the Nordic countries arguably cannot be 
considered to form “one bloc”.  
It is not the purpose of this thesis to investigate the positions of all the member states 
during the drafting of the Conclusions. For the sake of space, three of the member 
states often considered influential in EU policy-making, notably the UK, France and 
Germany will briefly be mentioned. These are states of considerable weight in 
international relations and EU policy-making. They are also among those states in the 
EU with a stated interest in the Arctic. If they were to have strong positions regarding 
Arctic issues, it is possible to believe that this could potentially influence the EU’s 
policy. However, contrary to what one might perhaps have expected neither the UK, 
nor Germany allegedly got significantly involved in the discussions (Respondent G; 
Respondent F). The UK, together with Spain advocated the importance of opening up 
new fishing territories.64 Germany, on the other hand, according to a German EU 
                                              
63 Note that the Finnish Foreign Minister, Mr. Stubb (2010), in a speech on the 17th of June 2010 informed that “Finland 
will act to convert the indisputable Arctic vocation of the EU into a more specific and stronger EU Arctic policy”. Whether 
he has the Northern Dimension in mind or the Arctic Policy, is unclear.  
64 Although it must not be forgotten that Spain has a huge research program on the Arctic (Respondent A), Spain and 
Portugal are primarily known for their interest in fisheries. Consequently, if there continues to be a problem with over-
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official, proposed the ban on new fisheries in territories not yet governed by an 
international fishing scheme in the Conclusions (Respondent F). Surprisingly, France 
was the most engaged of the three member states, indeed said to have been the one 
putting forward the initiative to make the Conclusions (Respondent D; Respondent 
G). Due to limited data, this study cannot set out to provide a full analysis of the 
Council drafting in 2009. This is neither the aim. The main objective of this chapter is 
to provide an insight into the internal dynamics of the three institutions as well as 
their actions before assessing the relations among them in the following chapter. The 
above section has provided indications suggesting that the Council is a less coherent 
actor than the Commission, mostly due, of course to its intergovernmental nature. 
Although there do not seem to be divisions as such, some member states have 
stronger positions than others concerning an EU Arctic approach.   
4.3 The European Parliament 
Although the Parliament is not considered a political entrepreneur in the same way as 
the Commission, it is still perceived to be a supranational institution in favour of 
more integration likely to increase its powers. Considering that the Commission 
proposal includes quite a large number of proposals concerning policy issues which 
would imply the co-decision procedure, it should therefore be in the interest of the 
Parliament to promote a broad Arctic Policy. Indeed, there seem to be clear 
indications that the Parliament has actively promoted Arctic issues since 2007. In 
fact, one Commission official noted that the Parliament has significantly contributed 
to raising the attention about Arctic issues in the EU through pushing the 
Commission and the Council to have an Arctic policy and thus supporting the MLG 
claim that all institutions matter in the process (Respondent D). In effect, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, there are even indications suggesting that the 
Parliament desires an even stronger role for the EU in the Arctic than what is 
favoured by the Commission and the Council.   
                                                                                                                                           
capacity in the EU fishing fleet, Spain and Portugal could run counter to Denmark on this issue, the latter which have rights 
and obligations related to the Arctic Ocean (Informant A). 
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The Parliament presented a resolution on Arctic governance on the 9th of October 
2008, a few weeks before the Commission introduced its Communication on the EU 
and the Arctic (Cf. European Parliament 2008a).65 It stressed the need for a 
standalone EU Arctic policy and urged the Commission to get actively involved in 
the Arctic beginning with obtaining a permanent observer status in the Arctic 
Council. The Resolution further stated that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic 
region is growing and highlighted its concerns over the ongoing race for natural 
resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU. It urged the 
Commission to propose joint working procedures for the EU and the Arctic countries 
in the fields such as sustainable development, security of energy supply and maritime 
safety. It also focused considerably on the issue of governance, claiming that the 
Arctic region is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral 
norms and regulations, and that the Commission should open international 
negotiations to adopt an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, based on 
the Antarctic Treaty. The Parliament prepared another resolution in the spring of 
2009 which reiterated the need for the Council and Commission to initiate 
negotiations on the abovementioned Arctic Treaty (Cf. European Parliament 2009h). 
The joint motion for a resolution also called on the Commission and Council to work 
towards establishing a moratorium on the exploitation of geological resources in the 
Arctic for a period of 50 years. However, the Parliament withdrew the Resolution to a 
large extent due to pressure from the Commission and Arctic states (Informant B; 
Respondent A; Respondent C). The most recent Parliament contribution to the policy 
process is the Parliamentary debate in March 2010 with the High Representative, Ms. 
Ashton (Cf. European Parliament 2010a). The Parliament is expected to produce an 
own initiative report on Arctic issues in the fall of 2010 as well as hosting the 
biannual meeting of parliamentarians of the Arctic region in September 2010 
(European Parliament 2010a).66  
                                              
65 Note that some MEPs in the Parliament have been engaged in Arctic issues long before the 2008 Resolution.  
66 In the areas where the treaties give the Parliament the right of initiative, its committees may draw up a report on a subject 
within its remit and present a motion for a resolution to be adopted in plenum. They must request authorisation from the 
Conference of Presidents before drawing up a report (European Parliament Website). 
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To what extent has there been internal fragmentation within the Parliament when it 
comes to deliberating Arctic policy initiatives? As with the Commission and the 
Council, the official documents are signed and accepted by all parties to the 
deliberation process. However, as has been demonstrated when it comes to the two 
abovementioned institutions, this may not necessarily mean that the process was free 
from discussion and different objectives. Preliminary findings suggest that the 
Parliament of 2004- 2009 seems to have conducted a fairly coherent process 
concerning the first and the second resolution. However, when it comes to internal 
coordination, the second resolution was arguably not as coordinated as the first. 
Furthermore, there are indications that the new Parliament 2009-2014, which 
replaced the old one in June last year, is somewhat less coherent. However, due to 
insufficient data, this last point will not be discussed in detail at this stage.  
When studying internal coherence in the Parliament, one way to proceed is to look at 
party groups, parliamentary debates and votes as these may reveal potential 
disagreements and divisions. Following the debate which took place during the sitting 
of 8 October 2008, the Parliament adopted by 597 votes to 23 with 41 abstentions a 
resolution on Arctic governance (European Parliament 2008c). Considering how 
almost 600 out of the then 732 members, supported the resolution, the latter seemed 
to have caused relatively little controversy. Of course, there were disagreements 
about amendments and wordings, both within and among party groups. For example, 
five members of GUE/NGL (European United Left/ Nordic Green Left), three of 
whom were from Nordic countries, did not support the resolution and stated that; 
“We believe that the starting point for all talks and initiatives concerning the Arctic 
area must be the respect of the sovereign territory of the Arctic nations and equally 
the inclusion of all the peoples of the Arctic area as equal partners” (European 
Parliament 2008b). Nevertheless, according to a Norwegian government official, the 
Parliament 2004-2009 had a strong environmental protection profile cutting across 
the different party groups (Informant A). Similarly, a Parliament official believes that 
there was more of a cooperative spirit in the former Parliament than in the current 
(Respondent E). Considering that the Parliament is often perceived as “greener” than 
the Commission and the Council, and that the most important focus of the resolution 
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was the protection of the Arctic, it is arguably not so surprising that the resolution 
gained large support among the MEPs (Respondent C). As for the resolution in 2009, 
a political advisor working in the Parliament believes that not all party groups agreed 
on the content, particularly not the moratorium, and that if it had been put to a vote, it 
would probably not have passed (Respondent G). This might be true, particularly 
after the Commission appeared before the Parliament, resulting in the EPP (Christian 
Democrats), the ALDE (Liberals and Democrats) and others wanting to postpone the 
resolution (Informant B). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that six of seven party 
groups drafted their own motion for a resolution and all the six groups called for an 
Arctic Treaty. Four of the six groups also wanted a moratorium on the exploitation of 
geological resources (Cf. European Parliament 2009f, 2009e, 2009d, 2009c, 2009i, 
2009g) . The joint motion for a resolution called for both; however, as has been 
mentioned, the vote on the resolution was postponed indefinitely. 
The drafting of the resolution in 2009, however, was arguably not as coordinated as it 
was coherent. Indeed, according to a Commission official, the second resolution was 
prepared in an uncoordinated and unstructured way (Respondent C). Normally, when 
a resolution is adopted, one of the 20 committees in the Parliament has prepared work 
for plenary sittings according to the topic to which the issue belongs e.g. foreign 
policy or internal marked.67 All MEPs are members of one or two such committees, 
and everything that is passed through the Parliament is based on what has been 
drafted in the committees. Cases are divided among parties depending on the issue in 
question and the size of the party. One important feature of the Parliament system is 
that it allows for individual parties to bring forward drafted proposals and even 
individuals to have a significant amount of influence. This might make Parliament 
policy output more unpredictable than Commission or Council output. Within each 
committee, cases are divided among the members. For each new issue, whether 
coming from the Commission or the Parliament itself, a rapporteur is appointed.68 It 
                                              
67 For a list of committees, see European Parliament Website (2010).  
68 A rapporteur could perhaps be viewed as the "liaison officer" of a committee. The rapporteur "reports" the findings of the 
European Parliamentary committee to the plenary. In that capacity their opinion carries a lot of weight (European Law 
Monitor) 
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is possible for an MEP to convince a committee to make a report about an issue and 
become rapporteur. If there is a majority in favour for a report within the committee, 
it goes to plenary session. According to a Norwegian diplomat to the EU, this is not 
very different from the procedure in the Norwegian Parliament, however, because 
there is no position and opposition in the European Parliament, the outcome is less 
predictable (Informant C). As pointed out by the diplomat, however, there is a system 
of checks and balances; a case does not go from a rapporteur to plenum without 
passing through a committee. Nevertheless, these checks and balances are exactly 
what two EU officials working for the Commission believe failed in 2009. The two 
officials believe that there was never appointed a rapporteur for the 2009 resolution; 
it did not go through any of the committees but was presented directly in plenum 
(Respondent A; Respondent C). As will be discussed later, the resolution in 2009 was 
not appreciated, neither by the Commission, nor the Council. To conclude this 
section, indications suggest that the Parliament 2004- 2009 was quite coherent in its 
actions related to the Arctic, but that its actions were not always the product of a 
coordinated process.  
Furthermore, concerning the current Parliament, findings are ambiguous. On the one 
hand, there have been indications since 2009 suggesting that the Parliament is 
abandoning its strong position on an Arctic treaty and a moratorium. This might have 
something do to with the elections in June 2009, which changed the political 
composition of the institution. Apparently, the new Parliament is less “green” than 
the former and also less internally coherent (Respondent E). Without going into 
detail, the fact that none of the motions for a Resolution on the EU and Canada in 
April 2010 put forwards by the different party groups contained a call for an Arctic 
Treaty and a moratorium, except the one from the Verts/ALE Group (Greens), might 
be an indication in support of the above claim (European Parliament 2010a, 2010d, 
2010e; 2009). On the other hand, there are indications suggesting that the Parliament, 
or at least different forces within it, have neither given up on contributing to 
developing the EU’s role in the Arctic, nor on the issue of governance. 
Parliamentarians are investigating the possibilities of using the Northern Dimension 
as a vehicle for developing the Arctic Policy (Respondent G). Furthermore, a 
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Parliament official mentioned an alternative to the broad Arctic Treaty, namely a 
narrower Arctic Convention. Apparently, this kind of an agreement could be easier to 
accept as it would pragmatically break down the Arctic into policy areas, making it 
possible to cover solely those issues that would fall within the Commission’s 
competence (Respondent F). Although investigating such indications is outside the 
scope of this paper, it nevertheless serves to highlight that the Parliament might prove 
important to institutional coherence in developing an EU Arctic approach in the 
future.  
To sum up this chapter, the aim of the above analysis was to address internal 
dynamics within the Commission, the Council and the Parliament as the first step in 
addressing the second assumption of the thesis, namely that the institutions will have 
slightly different approaches to the Arctic, something which might translate into 
challenges in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. Preliminary findings support 
the neo-functionalist assumption that the Commission would act as a political 
entrepreneur, and actively promote the EU Arctic Policy. However, contrary to 
expectations about internal fragmentation, there did not seem to be a high level of 
division or disagreement among the involved DGs, thus suggesting low levels of 
intra-institutional incoherence. Furthermore, the DGs seemed to work in a fairly 
coordinated manner. As for the Council, it is expected, based on intergovernmentalist 
aspects of EU policy-making, to defend the interests of the national governments and 
prevent the Commission from becoming too ambitious. Although further inquiries 
should be conducted, findings support perceiving the Council as favouring an Arctic 
policy for the Union, yet remaining cautious. This is arguably due to internal 
dynamics; there are at least some member states that have strong preferences when it 
comes to Arctic issues. Referring to Christiansen’s (2001) assumption about internal 
fragmentation, this, in turn, suggest that the Council is a less internally coherent actor 
than the Commission. Concerning the Parliament, although not expected to be a 
political entrepreneur in the same way as the Commission, has nevertheless engaged 
quite actively in promoting Arctic issues, well in line with the neo-functionalist view 
of supranational institutions. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the Parliament is 
perhaps the institution that has pursued the most ambitious agenda for EU 
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involvement in the Arctic. When it comes to intra-institutional coherence, the 
Parliament of 2004-2009 seems to have conducted a fairly coherent approach, albeit 
not always coordinated. In short, whereas the internal dynamics of the Council seem 
to have confirmed both assumptions regarding internal fragmentation and the nature 
of the Council’s approach to Arctic issues, the internal dynamics of the two 
supranational institutions seem to have confirmed the assumption about expected 
approaches, but not the one about internal fragmentation. These findings should not, 
however, be interpreted in absolute terms. The last chapter before the conclusion 
analyses the extent to which the differences in the institutions’ approaches accounted 
for in this chapter represent challenges in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. It 
addresses the relationship between firstly, the Commission and the Council, and 
secondly, between the Commission and the Council on the one hand, and the 
Parliament on the other. 
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5. Institutional relations and the Arctic Policy: On 
the same path? 
The previous chapter provided an insight into the internal workings of the 
institutions, something which revealed important information about their approaches 
towards the Arctic Policy and the differences between them. The focus is now 
directed at inter-institutional relations; to what extent have the institutions, e.g. the 
Council, the Commission and the Parliament operated a coherent and coordinated 
process of deliberation on Arctic issues since the desire for a standalone Arctic policy 
became a reality? To what extent have the differences in their approaches translated 
into possible challenges to a coherent process of deliberation? This chapter analyses 
the relations between firstly, the Council and the Commission, and secondly, the 
relations between the Council and the Commission on the on hand, and the 
Parliament on the other hand by drawing on the information provided in chapter four. 
Underpinning the study are the assumptions derived from neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism about the different nature and purpose of the institutions. 
Central is also the assumption that the supranational institutions will pursue similar 
approaches. The ambition is not to argue that the EU institutions are torn by issues of 
incoherence when it comes to the Arctic Policy. One would probably not find that the 
EU policy process is either coherent or incoherent; rather EU policy-making is 
normally characterised by elements of coherence as well as potential threats to 
coherence. The following analysis will highlight some of these nuances and thus 
provide knowledge about challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in developing 
its Arctic policy.  
5.1 The Commission and the Council 
Given that the EU strikes a balance between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism in policy-making it is assumed that there will be varying 
degrees of supranational and intergovernmental forces at play depending on the 
Arctic issues at hand. Furthermore, as was argued in the former chapter, the 
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institutions are seemingly pursuing slightly different approaches to the above issues, 
something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach.  
One the one hand, some interviewees claimed that there were tensions between the 
Council and the Commission during the process of drafting the Conclusions in 2009. 
According to a European Parliament political advisor, this might have been because 
one member state, namely Denmark, had its own agenda, something which it not 
unusual in Council discussions (Respondent G). As has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the Council is not an entirely coherent actor, but rather face, if not 
divisions, then at least clear member state positions. It is also possible to put it 
slightly differently, however, namely that the Commission might have put forward 
proposals in its Communication that caused some member states to worry. Indeed, 
some interviewees even suggested that the Arctic Policy is about the Commission 
expanding its competences, beginning with the Blue Book on Maritime affairs in 
2007 (Informant D). According to such views, in line with the neo-functionalist view 
of the Commission as a political entrepreneur, the underlying ambition for the 
Commission is to become a central player when it comes to the future of the Arctic 
(Cf. Informant A; Jensen 2007). Whether or not this is the rationale behind the 
Commission’s Communication, there are indications suggesting that a few 
Commission proposals were too ambitious for the Council, causing concern among 
some member states. The Council, in line with its intergovernmentalist purpose, thus 
exercised its responsibility to protect national interests and to ensure that the 
Commission did not launch too an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic.   
One of the most importance issues in this respect was what the Commission 
considered as a need for enhanced governance, expressed in the preamble as one of 
the three main policy objectives (Respondent H). While the Commission (2008e: 9-
10) recognises UNCLOS as the main legal instrument in the Arctic, and encourages 
“the full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new 
legal instruments”, the Communication nevertheless highlights problems relating to 
Arctic governance including “the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of 
effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-setting process and gaps in 
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participation, implementation and geographic scope”. Hence the third policy 
objective; “Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance”. Apparently, the 
need for enhanced governance particularly worried Denmark. According to a Danish 
EU official, Denmark (together with Norway) believed that the wording was too 
strong as there is already a legal structure in place, notably UNCLOS (Respondent 
H). In general, Denmark (and Norway) feel the need to emphasise that firstly, 
cooperation in the Arctic is not something new; secondly, that the Arctic Council is 
the most important organ; and thirdly, that there is already a legal structure in place, 
well suited to handle potential disputes (Respondent H; Informant A, Informant C). 
This might be have been the reason why the objective of “Contributing to enhanced 
Arctic multilateral governance” in the Commission’s Communication was changed to 
“Contributing to enhanced governance in the Arctic through implementation of 
relevant agreements, frameworks and arrangements, and their further development” 
in the Council Conclusions. In EU policy-making such subtle changes are arguably 
more significant than they appear to be. By adding a few words, the Council ensured 
that member states’ interests were taken into account while providing an indication as 
to how ambitious a role for the EU the Commission could expect to achieve. 
Furthermore, to Denmark and the UK, the right to govern over resources is also an 
important issue alongside the international legal issues. As a Norwegian diplomat in 
Brussels put it; they are not anxious to see the EU meddle in resource management or 
the establishment of management structures or institutions (Informant C). The 
diplomat continued pointing out that it is the member states that are parties to 
agreements; not the Commission. For example, according to a Danish EU official, 
Denmark and the UK are supporters of the IMO concerning transport at sea. They 
would like the EU to remember that it will never take the seat of the member states in 
this organisation (Respondent H). A Parliament official argued in a similar vein, 
stating that the EU as such is not likely to get a membership in the IMO as rules 
regarding the IMO are member state competences (Respondent F). Furthermore, 
although the Commission aims to strengthen the EU’s international presence through 
measures such as a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, the member 
states would never accept that the Commission took over the seat of the Arctic 
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member states (Respondent C). Therefore, possibly in order to give the Commission a 
gentle reminder of the Council’s position, Denmark, and probably others, managed to 
include “while recognising the member states’ legitimate interests and possibilities in 
the Arctic” in the preamble of the Council Conclusions; “the Council welcomes the 
gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and 
responsibilities, while recognising Member States’ legitimate interests and rights in 
the Arctic” (Informant C). Furthermore, the Council statement of 2009 echoes what 
was explicitly stated in the 2008 Conclusions, namely that “the particular positions 
and interests of the Arctic regions of the three Arctic member states, including the 
regions of one of the member states that enjoy the status of Overseas countries and 
territories (OCT) […] should be duly taken into account” (Conseil de l’Union 
Européenne 2008: 1).69 These two examples are particularly interesting in that they 
clearly illustrate the inherent differences in the nature, purpose and ambitions of the 
Council and the Commission; between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. 
While the latter institution promotes ambitious plans for the EU, the former puts the 
breaks on. They also provide clear indications as to the level of ambition that the 
Commission may pursue in the further development of the Arctic Policy.  
Contrary to the assumption that there would be, if not tensions between the 
institutions, then at least contrasts in their approaches, others argued that the Council 
and the Commission are pursuing a rather coherent approach towards Arctic issues. 
According to an EU official working for the Commission, there is no political 
difference between the Council and the Commission perceptions on the EU and the 
Arctic; rather the documents are worded slightly differently with the Council giving 
more prominence to the Arctic states (Respondent C). Another EU representative 
argued in a similar vein, saying that the Council Conclusions were very much in line 
with the Commission Communication. Apparently, the former only really added two 
accents; firstly, member states have to be taken into account; and secondly, the EU 
                                              
69 No English version of the Council Conclusions of 2008 seems to be available. I take all responsibility for any mistakes 
during translation. Original quote: “À cette fin, il convient de prendre dûment en considération la position et les intérêts 
particuliers des régions arctiques des trois États membres arctiques, y compris des régions d'un État membre qui bénéficient 
du statut de pays et territoires d'outre-mer et de liens contractuels particuliers avec l'UE“.  
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needs good relations with third countries (Respondent A). Furthermore, it is 
important to note that Denmark is not opposed to an Arctic policy. Indeed, as the 
Danish EU official emphasised; Denmark hopes that the Arctic Policy will be 
substantial (Respondent H). It supports that the Commission gets a permanent 
observer status in the Arctic Council as it believes that both the Commission and the 
EU can contribute in a positive way. However, although Denmark agrees with the 
Commission’s idea of a broad engagement of the EU in the Arctic, it remains 
cautious. The point that Denmark would like to make is that the EU must act with 
respect; it does not have any territories in the Arctic (Respondent H). Furthermore, 
concerning the changing of the wording in the Council Conclusions by Denmark, the 
Danish official argued that it did not cause much controversy between the Council 
and the Commission as there was not that strong a support for the wording within the 
Commission anyhow (Respondent H). The official continued stating that the 
Commission and the Council are cooperating to find common ground, which means 
that everybody must listen.70 Indeed, it must not be forgotten that the two institutions 
do not work in total isolation from each others. According to several interviewees, the 
Commission consulted, although informally, with certain Arctic states and member 
states when drafting the Communication (Respondent A; Respondent C; Informant 
B). Likewise, the Commission was represented during the Council Conclusions by 
DG RELEX. The latter would bring comments from the other DGs to the Swedish 
Presidency, which would in turn take account of the comments to the working groups 
(Respondent D). In sum, on the one hand, the Commission proposed an Arctic policy 
that was too ambitious for the Council. The latter reiterated the member states’ 
authority on the issues of governance and external representation as well as 
emphasising the rights of the Arctic states. On the other hand, there are indications 
suggesting that the two documents were not that politically different, and that issues 
were mainly related to wording. As will be illustrated below, however, the Parliament 
                                              
70 The Commission must evidently be particularly attentive towards the Council as it needs member states support for its 
initiatives to be adopted, particularly when it comes to foreign policy and external relations, thus illustrating the continued 
intergovernmental influence in EU policy-making.  
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seems to have pursued an ambition for the EU in the Arctic that is not welcomed by 
neither the Commission, nor the Council.   
5.2 The Commission, the Council, and the Parliament 
The Parliament’s contribution to the role of the EU in the Arctic has generally been 
appreciated by the Commission and the Council. As Ms. Ferrero Waldner (2009) said 
to the Parliament in 2009; “I would like to thank Parliament for its interest in the 
Arctic and also say how much we appreciated your resolution on Arctic governance 
last October. It gave political impetus to the Commission’s own work on the 
communication”. Furthermore, a Commission official recognised that the Parliament 
has made quite a large contribution about raising awareness about the Arctic issue in 
the EU (Respondent D). However, there are indications suggesting that the 
Parliament’s perceptions of a suitable level of ambition for the EU in the Arctic and 
of the content of an Arctic policy have not always been in line with the views of the 
Commission and the Council. While it is, perhaps not surprising that the Parliament’s 
approach would differ from that of the Council, it is more surprising that the 
Parliament would pursue an approach relatively out of line with the approach of the 
other supranational institution.  
It is particularly the calls for an Arctic Treaty and the moratorium that seem to have 
clashed with the approach of the two other institutions.71 As has been mentioned 
earlier, the Parliament called for an Arctic Treaty in its 2008 resolution and reiterated 
the call in the abandoned 2009 resolution the latter in which it also called for a 
moratorium on the extraction of resources in the region.72 However, already days 
before the Parliament adopted its first resolution in 2008, Commission representative, 
                                              
71 A different issue, the seal ban advocated by the Parliament in 2008, is perhaps the best example of how the Parliament 
has actual power over the EU’s approach to the Arctic, and thus supporting the MLG assumption that all institutions matter.  
It also illustrates divergences in the institutions’ approaches. However, it will not be discussed in this thesis, first and 
foremost due to lack of space, but also because the seal case is not really part of the Arctic policy process, but rather a 
normal legislative initiative that happened to have a quite negative impact on how the EU is perceived in relation to the 
Arctic. See for example European Parliament (2009b); Brennan (2009) and CBC News (2009). 
72  Note that the Council has supported a moratorium on fisheries in areas not yet covered by an international legal 
framework, and that according to a Norwegian government official, at least France, Germany as well as the Commission are 
leaning towards it (Informant A).  
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Špidla (2008) addressed the question about an Arctic Treaty by informing the 
Parliament that “it seems that the conditions are not yet in place for a binding legal 
framework specifically designed for this region”, and that the EU should rather 
advocate the use of the extended legal basis established by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and other interventional conventions. The 
Parliament nevertheless continued to promote an international treaty, re-launching the 
idea in its 2009 resolution and adding the call for a moratorium. Whereas a 
Commission official believed the 2008 Parliament resolution, with some exceptions, 
was helpful to the Commission’s drafting of the Communication, the 2009 resolution 
was different. Apparently, the Commission and the Council were in opposition in 
quite an unusually strong way. The official further believed that it was unfortunate 
that the Commission and the Council had to disagree to such an extent (Respondent 
A). He continued pointing out that the event did not take place behind closed doors, 
but rather in full glare of the public. Consequently, there has been a problem with 
external partners of the EU believing that actions of the Parliament equal actions of 
the EU, something which is not correct (Respondent A; Respondent C; Respondent 
E). The disagreement made the EU look fragmented in its approach to the Arctic.  
Indeed, in addition to Canada and Norway lobbying to avoid the resolution being 
adopted, both the President-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Vondra (2009), and the 
Commissioner for External Relations at the time, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner (2009), 
appeared before the MEPs and argued against the 2009 resolution.73 Mr. Vondra 
(2009) reiterated that neither the Commission’s Communication, nor the Council 
Conclusions expressed any support for the specific idea of an international treaty. 
Furthermore, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner (2009) informed that;  
[…] the idea of establishing a binding legal regime specifically designed 
for the Arctic is, unfortunately, difficult, because none of the five Arctic 
Ocean coastal states – Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia and the United 
States – is in favour of such a regime. I therefore fear that such a proposal 
would at this stage not only be ineffective but could prove to be 
detrimental to the EU’s role and credibility in overall Arctic cooperation.  
                                              
73 Note that Informant B did not mention Vondra; rather, see Vondra (2009) and the European Parliament debate (2009a). 
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According to the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the “Arctic Five” in May 2008, “the 
five coastal states are in a unique position to address […] possibilities and 
challenges” by virtue of their “sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large 
areas of the Arctic Ocean”, further pointing out that UNCLOS, “an extensive 
international legal framework” applies to the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Ocean Conference 
2008: 1). According to a Commission official and a Norwegian government official, 
Ms. Ferrero-Waldner wanted to make the point that firstly, the resolution might 
damage the Commission’s application for an observer status in the Arctic Council, 
secondly, it might damage the Union’s credibility as an actor in the Arctic, and, 
finally, such a move would possibly backfire on the both the Parliament and the EU 
(Informant A; Respondent C). The Commission official pointed out that it is 
perceived as rude in international relations to make statements about someone else’s 
territory (Respondent C). As for the moratorium, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner (2009) argued 
that “it is not realistic to propose an international moratorium on the extraction of 
Arctic resources” as the bulk of the estimated reserves of minerals, oil and gas are 
either on the sovereign territory of the Arctic states or in their exclusive economic 
zones, and some of them have far-reaching plans for further exploration activities”. 
Thus, neither the Commission, nor the Council supported the Parliament’s desire for 
an international treaty or a 50 year moratorium in the Arctic. In the end, the 
Parliament came around and withdrew the resolution. In sum, on the one hand, the 
Parliament has contributed to raising awareness about Arctic issues in the EU, 
something which has been appreciated by the Commission and the Council. On the 
other hand, it seems rather clear that the Parliament has pursued an approach towards 
the Arctic which has been somewhat out of kilter with the approaches of the other 
institutions. It is particularly the issue of the Arctic Treaty and the calls for a 
moratorium that has caused controversy.  
This chapter has addressed the second assumption of this thesis, namely that the 
institutions will have different approaches to the Arctic, something which might 
translate into challenges to a coherent EU approach.  The following section will not 
be able do justice to the various implications of the above for developing a coherent 
EU Arctic policy. Suffice to mention two particularly interesting examples of 
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potential challenges to a coherent EU Arctic policy. The first is related to vertical 
coherence and concerns member state positions related to Arctic issues. Indeed, the 
Council changed the wording of “sensitive issues” in the 2008 Communication into 
more “intergovernmental friendly” language in the Conclusions on several occasions, 
demonstrating the tensions between supranationalism and intergvernmentalism in EU 
policy-making. Although the political difference between the Commission and the 
Council might not be significant, it seems evident that the Commission will have to 
pay attention to issues of vertical coherence in further promoting and developing the 
EU Policy. Some member states, particularly Denmark, have clearly indicated that 
certain issues are, and should be, outside the competence of the EU, such as issues of 
governance and resources management. Consequently, if the EU were to develop an 
Arctic policy that was considered too ambitious to certain member states, the EU runs 
the risk of vertical incoherence in the case where a member state is no longer able to 
follow the agreed content of a policy. As has been mentioned before, this happened 
last year when the UK and the Netherlands voted against an agreed common EU 
position on the proposed ban on bluefin tuna, thus risking being called to court by the 
Commission (Hickman 2009; Rankin 2010b).  
Furthermore, findings also suggest that inter-institutional relations have represented a 
challenge to institutional coherence. It may seem as though the Parliament has 
pursued a more ambitious approach to Arctic issues than what has been preferred by 
the two other institutions. One implication of this was the dispute concerning the 
2009 resolution. It made the EU look institutionally fragmented in the face of the 
world, something which represents a risk to its credibility as a coherent actor in 
international politics. Again, the issue of vertical coherence was relevant in that the 
issues that caused controversy were the same as the ones that lead the Council to 
make changes to the Communication during the drafting of the 2009 Conclusions. 
However, the Parliament’s calls for an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium also seemed 
to have posed a challenge to inter-institutional coherence in that the Commission, and 
not only the Council, strongly opposed the resolution. This might seem somewhat 
surprising considering how it was assumed in the beginning of the thesis that the 
supranational institutions would be likely to pursue similar approaches. 
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Consequently, there is perhaps a need for a different, or additional theoretical 
approach in order to account for the behaviour of the Parliament. Nevertheless, it 
must be remembered that in the end, the Parliament withdrew the resolution. 
Although part of the damage had already happened, this might actually indicate 
possibilities for institutional coherence in EU policy-making; the Parliament listened 
to the other two institutions and realigned with their approaches. However, the 
uncertainty as to whether the current Parliament has realigned with the two other 
institutions, or whether it is still pursuing an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic, 
confirms the continued potential for institutional incoherence.  
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6. Concluding remarks: Towards a coherent EU 
Arctic approach?  
Coherence is not a problem. Everybody would support coherence. The problem is that nobody wants to be the 
subject of it. Who would take the lead? 
 
European Parliament official (Respondent F) 
This thesis has studied the European Union’s approach to the Arctic. As was 
explained in the introduction, developments in the Arctic region is attracting the 
attention of external actors about which little research has yet been conducted. 
Considering the potential impact of these external actors on the future of the region, it 
is important to increase knowledge about stakeholders and interests. The EU is a 
potentially significant actor in international politics that has clearly stated its interest 
in the region. Since 2007, EU institutions have devoted attention to Arctic issues and 
officially called for a standalone EU Arctic policy. There has been emphasis on the 
need for a more coordinated and coherent approach to the region. It is believed that 
coherence ensures more efficient foreign policies and increases the EU’s credibility 
as an actor in international politics. Coherence in EU foreign policy-making, 
however, is a well known issue, both theoretically and empirically. Considering the 
desire for a coherent policy and the challenges often related to achieving such 
policies, this thesis asked what main challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in 
developing a coherent Arctic policy. The main focus has been on institutional 
coherence, both within and between the institutions, taken to mean problems which 
may arise because the policy sector of external relations is handled by two sets of 
actors having different approaches to the same problem (Nuttall 2005: 97). It has also 
been defined to involve problems which may arise if the institutions have different 
objectives and perceptions concerning Arctic issues, which would impede a “coherent 
and well coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making” (Christiansen 
2001: 747). Given that institutional coherence is closely linked to vertical and 
horizontal coherence, it was necessary to also address aspects of the two latter types.  
The paper was explorative in nature, studying a policy which is currently in the 
making. Two sets of premises and assumptions have guided the analysis. The 
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premises were derived from FPA of which the first stated that the EU should not be 
seen as a unitary actor in foreign policy-making. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, 
the Arctic Policy is relevant to all three institutions, albeit having different levels of 
influence, not necessarily sharing the same objectives. As was pointed out in relation 
to the Parliament’s quest for an Arctic treaty, it is important to be aware that the 
actions of one institution do not necessarily represent the entire Union. The second 
premise concerned how to approach the study of European foreign policy and implied 
that EFP has to be defined more broadly than just the CFSP of the member states. 
While providing support for such an argument the study has also introduced a further 
challenge, namely how to study issues which are of an external nature, but which, in 
addition to external relations and CFSP also include internal policies.  
The analytical approach of MLG provided the first assumption, addressed in chapter 
three, which stated that all institutions would matter in the policy process. In order to 
provide support for the claim, the discussion had to demonstrate that Arctic issues 
were not only CFSP matters over which the supranational institutions had reduced 
influence. Indeed, the findings showed that, although nothing is yet settled, the Arctic 
Policy will most likely by cross-pillar in nature, comprising both internal and external 
policies on the one hand, and both CFSP and external relations on the other. Although 
the member states remain the most important actors in the process, the Commission 
clearly plays an important role in terms of producing initiatives related to Arctic 
issues. Furthermore, it is possible that the Parliament will have considerable influence 
over issues subject to the co-decision procedure and some, albeit lesser, influence, on 
foreign policy issues, such as the conclusion of international agreements. One 
implication is that all three institutions should be taken into account when studying 
the EU Arctic Policy. This might, in turn, pose challenges to institutional coherence 
in that it seems to increase the potential for diverging objectives and ambitions, 
something which was addressed in chapter four and five. The second assumption was 
somewhat more complex. It was based on elements from both neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism about the purpose and behaviour of each institution, and stated 
that they would have different approaches to the Arctic, something which could 
potentially pose challenges to institutional coherence, or the coherent process of 
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deliberation and decision-making. Chapter four provided an analysis of intra-
institutional dynamics, an issue that was important to address before looking at the 
relationship between the institutions. It found that the Commission and the Parliament 
were more internally coherent than the Council when it came to Arctic issues. It also 
found indications, however, suggesting that the Parliament might have been less 
internally coordinated than the Commission in developing Arctic policy-outputs. 
Furthermore, the Commission and the Parliament, in line with neo-functionalism, 
appeared to actively promote the Arctic Policy. Conversely, the Council supported it, 
but remained more cautious as expected based on its intergovernmental nature.  
The final chapter analysed inter-institutional relations. It found that, while the 
approaches of the Commission and the Council did not seem to be that different, 
there appear to be some strong member state positions on Arctic issues in the 
Council. Consequently, the Commission will have to take vertical coherence into 
account in the EU’s approach towards the Arctic in order to ensure a coherent EU 
policy. There are clearly limits as to how far Denmark and others would like the EU 
to go. Issues related to governance and resources management, for example, are 
considered outside the competence of the EU. Consequently, if the EU were to 
develop an Arctic policy that would be considered too ambitious to certain member 
states, the EU runs the risk of vertical incoherence if a member state is no longer able 
to follow the agreed content of a policy. Findings also suggested that the Parliament 
has pursued a somewhat more ambitious approach to Arctic issues than what is 
supported by the two other institutions. Again, the issue of vertical coherence is 
relevant in that the issues that caused controversy were the same as the ones in the 
Communication that lead the Council to make changes. However, the Parliament’s 
calls for an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium also seemed to have posed a challenge to 
inter-institutional coherence in that the Commission seemed to be in as much 
opposition as the Council. It is worth recalling what Ms Ferrero Waldner (2009), 
representing the Commission, stated to the Parliament in 2009, namely that the 
proposed legal framework “could prove to be detrimental to the EU’s role and 
credibility in overall Arctic cooperation” as neither the Arctic states, nor the 
Commission or the Council wanted it. This is a powerful message about what the 
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Commission and the Council believe to be an appropriate level of ambition for the 
EU in the Arctic, and a clear indication of differences in institutional approaches. 
Furthermore, the fact that there is uncertainty concerning whether or not the current 
Parliament has truly realigned with the two other institutions, or whether or not it is 
still pursuing an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic, confirms the continued 
potential for institutional incoherence.   
The thesis has indicated that the institutional relationship towards Arctic issues has 
not been entirely free from potential challenges to coherence, due to the different 
approaches of the institutions. Indeed, the EU is facing significant challenges in 
developing a coherent Arctic policy. There will be challenges related to coordinating 
between various policy areas, i.e. horizontal coherence, which has not received much 
space in the paper. Furthermore, the fact that all three institutions are likely to have 
influence over the policy, combined with the inherent tension between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making, arguably serve to 
increase the risk of incoherence in the institutions’ common approach to the Arctic. 
Finally, there are clear indications of potential issues related to vertical coherence in 
that some member states, particularly Denmark, have interests and obligations in the 
Arctic, which might clash with EU ambitions. Despite these potential challenges, 
however, it is important to note that EU policy-making is likely to always display 
elements of incoherence, simply as a result of the nature of the policy-system. This, 
however, does not mean that the Union will not succeed in developing an Arctic 
policy. It means that it is important to be aware of how the dynamics at play in EU 
policymaking, particularly cross-pillar foreign policies such as the Arctic, affect the 
ability of the EU to develop and produce coherent policies. It is, in other words, 
important in order to understand the current and possibly future EU approach to the 
Arctic region.  
Although this thesis was explorative in nature and relied on general assumptions, it 
has arguably contributed both to increased knowledge about the EU as an actor in the 
Arctic as well as about EU foreign policy making in general. Concerning EPF, the 
study has illustrated the complexity of policy issues which are both internal and 
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external in nature, further concerning both external relations and CFSP. It has 
provided support for the use of MLG as an analytical approach in that it has allowed 
to analyse the EU Arctic policy-process in terms of what is there using elements from 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, rather than why based on any of the 
above theories alone. The thesis has also contributed to knowledge about the EU as 
an actor in the Arctic. It has provided support for arguing that all three institutions 
matter when it comes to complex policy areas such as the Arctic Policy. In other 
words, the Arctic Policy outcome is likely to be influenced, perhaps mainly by the 
Council, but also by the Commission and the Parliament. As has been demonstrated, 
their perceptions influence on the EU’s approach. Furthermore, the study has reveal 
information about internal dynamics within each of the three institutions as well as 
their actions and approaches to the Arctic. Of particular interest are the, albeit not 
fully developed, member state positions in the Council. Finally, it has analysed inter-
institutional relations, identifying issues which have arguably posed challenges to 
institutional coherence as well as indicating implications for the future.  
The study should therefore provide a good foundation for further research on the EU 
and the Arctic as the policy process evolves. Several interesting questions need to be 
addressed: What will the implications of the Lisbon Treaty be on the Arctic Policy? 
Equally interesting, what will the impact be of Iceland’s access the EU? Will Iceland 
align with Denmark? How will member states relate to the Arctic region as they 
develop clearer positions and interests? Will they consider the policy CFSP or will 
they prefer it to be developed within the Commission’s competence? What role will 
the Commission take on; a political entrepreneur or a mediator between the Council 
and the Parliament? Even more importantly, what will happen in the Arctic region? 
There are many issues yet to be explored concerning the EU and the Arctic. However, 
this thesis has arguably provided a solid base from which to proceed. 
  
 81 
 
 82 
Bibliography 
Books and book chapters 
Airoldi, Adele. 2008. The European Union and the Arctic. Policies and Actions. 
Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. 
Babbie, Earl R. 2009. The Practice of Social Research. 12th ed. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Publishing. 
Bache, Ian, and Matthew Flinders. 2004a. Multi-level governance. Edited by I. Bache 
and M. Flinders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bache, Ian, and Stephen George. 2006. Politics in the European Union. 2nd ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bretherton, Charlotten, and John Vogler. 2006. The European Union as a Global 
Actor. 2 ed. Oxon: Routledge. 
Bryman, Alan. 2004. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carlsnaes, Walter. 2003. Foreign Policy. In Handbook of international relations, 
edited by W. Carlsnaes, et al. London: Sage Publications. 
———. 2004a. Introduction. In Contemporary European Foreign Policy. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Cini, Michelle. 2007a. European Union politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2007b. Intergovernmentalism. In European Union Politics, edited by M. 
Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Egeberg, Morten. 2006. Multilevel Union Administration. The Transformation of 
Executive Politics in Europe. Edited by M. Egeberg. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
———. 2007. The European Commission. In European Union Politics, edited by M. 
Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ekengren, Magnus, and Bengt Sundelius. 2004. National Foreign Policy Co-
ordination. In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, edited by W. 
Carlsnaes, et al. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Flick, Uwe. 2007. Doing Conversation, Discourse and Document Analysis. London: 
Sage Publications. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences: MIT Press. 
Ginsberg, Roy H. 2001. The European Union in International Politics. Baptism by 
Fire. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefields Publishers, Inc. . 
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, and Helen Wallace. 2006. The Council of Ministers. 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hill, Christopher. 2003. The changing politics of foreign policy. Hamphire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hillion, Christophe. 2008. Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External 
Relations of the European Union. In Developments in EU External Relations 
Law, edited by M. Cremona: Oxford. 
Hoel, Alf Håkon. 2009. The High North Legal-Political Regime. In Security 
prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?, edited by S. G. 
Holtsmark and B. A. Smith-Windsor. Rome: Nato Defence College. 
 83 
Hoel, Alf Håkon, and Hjalmar Vilhjamsson. 2004. Arctic Fisheries. In Encyclopedia 
of the Arctic, edited by M. Nutall. London: Routledge. 
Holtsmark, Sven G. 2009. Towards cooperation or confrontation? Security in the 
High North, NATO Defense College Research Paper. Rome: Nato Defence 
College. 
Hooghe, Liesbet. 1996. Cohesion Policy and European Integration: building multi-
level governance. Edited by L. Hooghe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-level governance and European 
integration. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Hoyle, Rick H., et al. 2002. Research Methods in Social Relations. 7th ed: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc. 
Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. 
Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
———. 2008. The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis. In Foreign 
policy: theories, actors, cases, edited by S. Smith, et al. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: political, social and economic forces, 
1950-1957. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Jacobsen, Dag Ingvar. 2005. Hvordan gjennomføre undersøkelser? Innføring i 
samfunnsvitenskapelig metode: Høyskoleforlaget. 
Jensen, Carsten Strøby. 2007. Neo-Functionalism. In European Union Politics, edited 
by M. Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Keukeleire, Stephan, and Jennifer MacNaughtan. 2008. The Foreign Policy of the 
European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
King, Gary, et al. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research: Princeton University Press. 
Kvale, Steinar. 1997. Det kvalitative forskningsintervju. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal. 
Lasserre, Frédéric. 2009. High North Shipping: Myths and Realities. In Security 
prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?, edited by S. G. 
Holtsmark and B. A. Smith-Windsor. Rome: Nato Defence College. 
Marks, Gary. 1992. Structural Policy in the European Community. In Euro-politics, 
Institutions and Policy-making in the 'New' European Community, edited by 
A. Sbragia. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution. 
———. 1993. Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC. In The State 
of the European Community: The Maastrict Debate and Beyond, edited by A. 
Cafruny and G. Rosenthal. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Marks, Gary, and Liesbet Hooghe. 2003. Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level 
Governance. In Multi-Level Governance: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Missiroli, Antonio. 2001. Introduction. In Coherence for European Foreign Policy: 
Debates, Cases, Assessments, edited by A. Missiroli: Institute for Security 
Studies, Western European Union. 
Nuttall, Simon. 2005. Coherence and Consistency. In International Relations and the 
European Union, edited by C. Hill and M. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 84 
Offerdal, Kristine. 2009. High North Energy: Myths and Realities. In Security 
prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze? , edited by S. G. 
Holtsmark and B. A. Smith-Windsor. Rome: Nato Defence College. 
Petersen, Nikolaj. 2009. The Arctic as a New Arena for Danish Foreign Policy: The 
Illulisat Initiative and its Implications. In Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 
2009. 
Phinnemore, David. 2007. Towards European Union. In European Union Politics, 
edited by M. Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rosamond, Ben. 2007. New Theories of European Integration. In European Union 
politics, edited by M. Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sandholtz, Wayne, and Alec Stone Sweet. 1998. European integration and 
supranational governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scully, Roger. 2007. The European Parliament. In European Union Politics, edited 
by M. Cini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, Hazel. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What it Does. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Smith, Karen E. 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Smith, Michael. 2001. The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External 
Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam. In The Institutionalization of Europe, 
edited by N. Fligstein, et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, Steve, et al. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Edited by S. Smith, 
et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
White, Brian. 2001. Understanding European Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave. 
———. 2004. Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe. In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, edited by W. Carlsnaes, et al. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications   
Journal articles 
Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard 
for Qualitative and Quantitative Research. American Political Science Review 
95 (3):529- 546. 
Andersen, Svein S. 2006. Aktiv informantintervjuing. Norsk statsvitenskapelige 
tidsskrift 3:278-296. 
Bache, Ian, and Matthew Flinders. 2004b. Multi-Level Governance and the Study of 
the British State. Public Policy and Administration 19 (1):31-51. 
Bailes, Alyson. 2009. How the EU could help cool tempers over the Arctic. Europe's 
World (June). 
Borgerson, Scott G. 2008. Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming. Foreign Affairs (March/April). 
Carlsnaes, Walter. 2004b. Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy going? 
European Union Politics (December):1-17. 
Caspers, Jan. 2008. The Quest for European Foreign Policy Consistency and the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Humanitas Journal of European Studies 2 (1):19-53. 
 85 
Christiansen, Thomas. 2001. Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional 
relations in the EU: towards coherent governance? Journal of EUropean 
Public Policy 8 (5):747- 769. 
Duke, Simon. 1999. Consistency as an Issue in EU External Activities. European 
Institute of Public Administration (Working Paper 99):1-39. 
———. 2000. Is Being Consistently Inconsistent, Being Consistent? Eipascope (1). 
European Science Foundation. 2010. Editorial. European Polar Board Newsletter (4). 
Filtenborg, Mette Sicard, et al. 2002. An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU 
Foreign Policy: 'Network Governance' and the Case of the Northern 
Dinemsion Initiative. Cooperation and Conflict 37 (4):387- 407. 
Garrison, Jean A. 2003. Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium. 
International Studies Review 5:155-202. 
Gauttier, Pascal. 2004. Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the 
European Union. European Law Journal 10 (1):23–41. 
Ginsberg, Roy H. 1999. Conceptualizing the European Union as an International 
Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 37 (3):429–54. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus. 2001. The Governance Approach to European Integration. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (2):245–64. 
Jakobson, Linda. 2010. China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic. SIPRI Insights on 
Peace and Security (2):1-16. 
Leal-Arcas, Rafael. 2006. Theories of Supranationalism in the EU. Berkeley 
Electronic Press Series, Harvard Law School (1790):1-23. 
Marks, Gary, and Liesbet Hooghe. 1996. European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 34 
(3):341- 378. 
Mernild, Sebastian H., et al. 2009. Greenland Ice Sheet surface mass-balance 
modelling and freshwater flux for 2007, and in a 1995-2007 perspective. 
Hydrological Processes 23:2470–2484. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. Preferences and power in the European Community: A 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies 31 
(4):473–524. 
Offerdal, Kristine. 2010. Arctic Energy in EU Policy: Arbitrary Interest in the 
Norwegian High North. The Arctic Institute of North America 63 (1):30- 42. 
Piattoni, Simona. 2009. Multi-level Governance: a Historical and Conceptual 
Analysis. Journal of European Integration 31 (2):163-180. 
Pollack, Mark A. 2005. Theorezing the European Union: International Organization, 
Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance? Annual Review of 
Political Science (8):357- 98. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games. International Organization 42 (3):427-460. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Wolfgang Wagner. 2004. Preface: External governance 
in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4):657- 660. 
Skogrand, Kjetil. 2008. The Arctic in a Geo-Strategic Perspective. In Emerging from 
the Frost. Security in the 21st Century Arctic. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies  
 86 
Smith, Michael E. 2004. Toward a theory of EU foreign policymaking: multi-level 
governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe’s common 
foreign and security policy. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4):740–
758. 
White, Brian. 1999. The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis. European 
Journal of International Relations 5 (1):37-66. 
Young, Oran R. 2009. Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar 
north. Polar Record 45 (1):73-82. 
Newspaper articles 
Amos, Jonathan. 2007. Arctic summers ice-free ‘by 2013'. BBC, 12th December. 
Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7139797.stm (accessed 10.11.09). 
Barents Observer. 2010. EU may locate Arctic info centre to Rovaniemi. 19th April. 
Available from http://www.barentsobserver.com/eu-may-locate-arctic-info-
centre-to-rovaniemi.4774607-16174.html (accessed 22.06.10). 
BBC. 2010. EU set to open membership talks with Iceland. 17th June. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10342863.stm (accessed 2010). 
Brennan, Richard J. 2009. 'Disastrous' EU seal ban casts gloom over summit. The 
Star, 6th May. Available from 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/629662 (accessed 30.06.10). 
Burkeman, Oliver. 2008. A very cold war indeed. Guardian 5th April. Available 
from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/05/poles.endangeredhabitats 
(accessed 10.11.09). 
Euractive. 2006. Gas crisis resolved but lack of EU energy policy remains problem. 
5th January. Available from http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/gas-crisis-
resolved-lack-eu-energy-policy-remains-problem/article-151227 (accessed 
10.06.2010). 
Graff, James. 2007. Fight for the Top of the World. Time 19th September. Available 
from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1663445,00.html 
(accessed 10.11.09). 
Hansen, Jesper. 2008. Increasing Non-arctic interest in the Arctic Council. Arctic 
Council, 8th April. Available from http://arctic-
council.org/article/2008/4/increasing_non-
arctic_interest_in_the_arctic_council (accessed 12.02.10). 
Hickman, Martin. 2009. Europe unites in attempt to protect bluefin tuna. The 
Independent, 9th September. Available from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/europe-unites-in-attempt-
to-protect-bluefin-tuna-1783864.html (accessed 10.06.2010). 
Le Figaro. 2009. Rocard, ambassadeur pour les pôles. 18th March. Available from 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2009/03/18/01011-
20090318FILWWW00473-rocard-ambassadeur-pour-les-poles.php (accessed 
10.07.10). 
Nøra, Stig. 2010. Kina vil ha sin del av Nordområdene. Mandag Morgen, 10th 
January. Available from http://www.mandagmorgen.no/kina-vil-ha-sin-del-av-
nordomr%C3%A5dene (accessed 12.02.10). 
 87 
Pedersen, Torbjørn. 2009. Utenriksanalyse: Knus mytene om Arktis. Morgenbladet, 
24th July. Available from 
http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090724/OAKTUE
LT/34322531 (accessed 10.10.09). 
Phillips, Leigh. 2008. Europe's Arctic adventure - The new cold rush for resources. 
Euobserver 7th November. Available from http://euobserver.com/9/27035 
(accessed 18.11.09). 
Rankin, Jennifer. 2010. Member states face legal action over bluefin tuna vote. 
European Voice, 29th April. Available from 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/member-states-face-legal-
action-over-bluefin-tuna-vote/67807.aspx (accessed 05.07.10). 
Rottem, Svein Vigeland. 2009. Overdrivelser om Arktis. Nordlys, 5th October. 
Available from http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/SVR_Arktis_Nordlys_2009.pdf 
(accessed 18.11.09). 
RT. 2008. Ukraine - time to pay gas bills. 25th November. Available from 
http://rt.com/Top_News/2008-11-25/Ukraine_-_time_to_pay_gas_bills.html 
(accessed 10.06.10). 
Se-jeong, Kim. 2008. Korea Wants to Join in Arctic Projects. Korea Times 24th 
August. Available from 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/04/176_29902.html 
(accessed 12.02.10). 
Snyder, John. 2007. Tourism in the Polar Regions. The sustainability challenge. 
United Nations Environment Programme. Available from 
http://www.grida.no/publications/tourism-polar/ (accessed 19.11.09). 
Telegraph. 2009. Greenland takes step toward independence from Denmark. 21 June. 
Available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greenland/5594140/Gree
nland-takes-step-toward-independence-from-Denmark.html (accessed 
20.06.10). 
The Canadian Press. 2009. Canada contests EU seal ban at WTO. CBC News, 2nd 
November. Available from 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2009/11/02/wto-seal-trade-dispute-
stockwell-day.html (accessed 30.06.10). 
Official documents 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. 2004. Impacts of a Warming Climate: Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment. 
Arctic Council. 2009. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, final report. Available from 
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/SAO%20Meeting%20nov09-
%20FINAL.pdf (accessed 12.02.10). 
Arctic Ocean Conference. 2008. The Ilulissat Declaration. Available from 
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf (accessed 
05.07.10). 
Bernstein, Lenny, et al. 2007. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. An 
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available 
 88 
from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (accessed 
15.10.09). 
Conseil de l’Union Européenne. 2008. Conclusions du Conseil sur l'Union 
européenne et la région arctique. Available from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/fr/gena/104
580.pdf (accessed 19.11.09). 
Council of the European Union. 2009. Council conclusions on Arctic issues. 
Available from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/11
1814.pdf (accessed 05.06.10). 
Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2009. Estonian Review 19 - 25 August 2009. 
Available from http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8341 (accessed 25.06.10). 
European Commission. 2007a. Governance Statement of the European Commission. 
Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_statement_en.pdf 
(accessed 10.07.10). 
———. 2007b. Communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe. COM(2007) 1 final. 
Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:EN:PDF. 
———. 2007c. An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union. Available 
from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF 
(accessed 10.06.2010). 
———. 2008a. The Arctic merits the European Union's attention – first step towards 
an EU Arctic Policy. Press Release. Available from 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1750&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 19.11.09). 
———. 2008b. An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, Second Strategic 
Energy Review, COM(2008) 781 final. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/doc/2008_11_ser2/strategic_energy
_review_wd_future_position2.pdf (accessed 01.06.10). 
———. 2008c. Arctic Communication. European Commission Memo. 
MEMO/08/726. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/press/press_rel201108_en.html (accessed 
07.04.10). 
———. 2008d. Facts and figures on the CFP: Basic data on the Common Fisheries 
Policy. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/pcp08_en.pdf 
(accessed 30.06.10). 
———. 2008e. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region. COM(2008) 763 
final. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf 
(accessed 19.11.09). 
 89 
———. 2009a. What is Europe’s trade policy? Available from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/may/tradoc_143154.pdf (accessed 
30.06.10). 
European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP. 2008. Climate 
Change and International Security. Available from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/
99387.pdf (accessed 19.11.09). 
European Parliament. 2008a. Resolution on Arctic governance. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refe
rence=P6-TA-2008-0474 (accessed 15.11.09). 
———. 2008b. European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic 
governance: Explanations of vote. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20081
009&secondRef=ITEM-010&language=EN&ring=P6-RC-2008-0523#4-263 
(accessed 10.07.10). 
———. 2008c. The Legislative Observatory: Resolution on Arctic governance. 
Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=R
SP/2008/2633 (accessed 06.06.10). 
———. 2009a. Parliamentary Debate: Opening of international negotiations in view 
of adopting an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic. Available 
from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090
401&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN&ring=B6-2009-0163 (accessed 
30.06.10). 
———. 2009b. MEPs adopt strict conditions for the placing on the market of seal 
products in the European Union. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20090504IPR54952+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 30.06.10). 
———. 2009c. PSE Group: Motion for a Resolution on the opening of international 
negotiations with a view to adopting an 
international treaty for the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B6-2009-0163+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
(accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2009d. PPE-DE Group: Motion for a Resolution on the international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B
6-2009-0172&language=EN (accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2009e. GUE/NGL Group: Motion for a Resolution on the international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B
6-2009-0173&format=XML&language=EN (accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2009f. ALDE Group: Motion for a Resolution on the international treaty for 
the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
 90 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B
6-2009-0175&language=EN (accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2009g. Verts/ALE Group: Motion for a Resolution on the international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B
6-2009-0174&language=EN (accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2009h. Joint Motion for a Resolution on the International Treaty for the 
Protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P
6-RC-2009-0163&language=EN (accessed 05.07.10). 
———. 2009i. UEN Group: Motion for a Resolution on the international treaty for 
the protection of the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B
6-2009-0176&language=EN (accessed 28.06.10). 
———. 2010a. Parliamentary Debate: EU policy on Arctic issues Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20100
310&secondRef=ITEM-011&format=XML&language=EN (accessed 
27.06.10). 
———. 2010. The Legislative Observatory: EU policy on Arctic issues  2010b [cited 
27th June 2010]. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=R
SP/2009/2814. 
European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication. 2009. The European 
Parliament. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/welcome_brochures/for_you/working_for_
you_en.pdf (accessed 20.05.10). 
Ferrero-Waldner, Benito. 2009. European Parliament Debate, 1st April. Available 
from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090
401&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN&ring=B6-2009-0163 (accessed 
05.07.10). 
Gaudin, Christian. 2007. French polar research on the eve of the International Polar 
Year. Available from 
http://www.senat.fr/opecst/english_report_polar_research/english_report_polar
_research.html (accessed 15.12.09). 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 2010. Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region 
drafted. Available from 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=194146&nodeid=15145
&contentlan=2&culture=en-US (accessed 25.06.10). 
Official Journal of the European Union. 1987. Single European Act. Available from 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_si
ngleact_en.htm (accessed 01.05.10). 
———. 1992. Treaty on the European Union. Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html (accessed 22.04.10). 
Špidla, Vladimir. 2008. European Parliament Debate and Questions, 8th October. 
Available from 
 91 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20081
008&secondRef=ITEM-025&language=EN (accessed 10.11.09). 
Swedish EU Presidency. 2009. A step towards an EU arctic policy. Available from 
http://www.se2009.eu/en/meetings_news/2009/12/8/a_step_towards_an_eu_ar
ctic_policy (accessed 01.03.10). 
U.S. Geological Survey. 2000a. U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet: Sea Level and 
Climate. Available from http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs2-00/ (accessed 30.11.09). 
———. 2000b. U.S. Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment 2000-
Description and Results. Available from http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-060/ 
(accessed 18.11.09). 
Udenrigsministeriet. 2008. Arktis i en brydningstid: Forslag til strategi for aktiviteter 
i det arktiske område. Available from 
http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/962AFDC2-30CE-412D-B7C7-
070241C7D9D8/0/ARKTISK_STRATEGI.pdf (accessed 20.06.2010). 
Utenriksdepartementet. 2006. Regjeringens nordområdestrategi. Available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/pla/2006/0006/ddd/pdfv/302927-
nstrategi06.pdf (accessed 20.04.10). 
———. 2007. Regjeringens Tyskland-strategi. Available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Tysklandstrategi.pdf (accessed 
15.12.09). 
———. 2009. St. meld nr. 15. Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk 
utenrikspolitikk. 
Vondra, Alexandr. 2009. European Parliament Debate, 1st April. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090
401&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN&ring=B6-2009-0163 (accessed 
05.07.10). 
Conference proceedings 
Archer, Clive. 2010. Norway and the United Kingdom in the High North. Paper read 
at Symposium on Britain and Norway: Contacts, Networks and Influences, 11-
13th March, at Oslo. 
Borg, Joe. 2009. Opportunities and responsibilities in the Arctic Region: the 
European Union's perspective. Paper read at New chances and new 
responsibilities in the Arctic Region, 11th of March at Berlin. Available from 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/107&fo
rmat=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 10.10.09). 
de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap. 2009. Security Prospects in the High North. Paper read at 
Security Prospects in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze?, 29th -
30th January, at Reykjavik. Available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html (accessed 20.02.10). 
Global Biodiversity Sub-Committee. 2008. UK-Arctic Stakeholders report. Paper 
read at the Scottish Association for Marine Sciences, 10th -12th  March, at 
Oban. Available from 
http://www.jncc.gov.uk/pdf/gbsc_0809arcticbiodiversityobanreport.pdf 
(accessed 10.11.09). 
 92 
Portela, Clara, and Kolja Raube. 2009. (In)Coherence in EU Foreign Policy: 
Exploring Sources and Remedies. Paper read at European Studies Association 
Biannual Convention, at Los Angeles. Available from 
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/portela_11B.pdf (accessed 
05.06.10). 
Stubb, Alexander. 2010. Minister Stubb: High Time for the High North. Paper read at 
Nato seminar organised by the Parliament, 17th June, at Helsinki. Available 
from 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=195010&nodeid=15149
&contentlan=2&culture=en-US (accessed 27.06.10). 
Støre, Jonas Gahr. 2008a. Arctic Governance in a global world: is it time for an 
Arctic Charter? Paper read at Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) Seminar on Arctic Governance, The European Parliament, 7th May, 
at Brussels. Available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriksministeren/
2008/arctic_charter.html?id=511991 (accessed 30.06.10). 
———. 2008b. EU og Nordområdene. Paper read at Nasjonalt Europaforum, 
Universitetet i Tromsø, 25th November, at Tromsø. Available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriksministeren/
2008/europaforum_uit.html?id=537535 (accessed 30.06.10). 
Wallis, Diana. 2008. Cross-border governance in vulnerable areas: has the EU 
anything to offer in the Arctic? Paper read at Standing Committee of the 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 28th February at Rovaniemi, Finland. 
Available from 
http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/resources/sites/82.165.40.25-
416d2c46d399e8.07328850/Arctic+Speech+%28Rovaniemi+2008%29.pdf 
(accessed 20.04.10). 
Websites 
Arctic Council Website. 2010.  [cited 20.04 2010]. Available from http://www.arctic-
council.org/. 
Council of the European Union Website. 2010.  [cited 20th May 2010]. Available 
from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=242&lang=EN. 
Eurlex: Access to European Law. 2010.  [cited 15th May 2010]. Available from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ga/droit_communautaire/union_europeenne.gif. 
European Commission. 2010. Security of supply  2009b [cited 30th June 2010]. 
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/security/index_en.htm. 
European Commission Website. 2010. European Commission Civil Service  [cited 
20th May 2010]. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/who/index_en.htm. 
———. 2010. EU Relations with Greenland  [cited 25th May 2010]. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/count
ry_profile.cfm?cid=gl&type=short&lng=en. 
———. 2010. EU action against climate change  [cited 30th June 2010]. Available 
from http://ec.europa.eu/climateaction/eu_action/index_en.htm. 
 93 
European Law Monitor. 2010. What is a Rapporteur?  [cited 28th June 2010]. 
Available from http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/EU-Information/What-Is-
Guide-to-Key-EU-Terms/EU-Parliament-What-Is-a-Rapporteur.html. 
European Navigator. 2010. The second pillar of the European Union: common 
foreign an security policy. Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe 
[cited 20th Mary 2010]. Available from http://www.ena.lu/. 
———. 2010. The first pillar of the European Union. Centre Virtuel de la 
Connaissance sur l'Europe [cited 20th May 2010]. Available from 
http://www.ena.lu/. 
European Parliament Website. 2010. Legislative initiative procedure  [cited 28th June 
2010]. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/staticDisplay.do?id=55&pag
eRank=13&language=EN. 
———. 2010. Standing Committees  2010 [cited 28th June 2010]. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/committeesList.do?langu
age=EN. 
Eurostat. 2008. Energy production and imports. Available from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_product
ion_and_imports. 
Folketinget Webpage. 2010. EU-Oplysningen: What is Greenland’s relationship with 
the EU? [cited 25th May 2010]. Available from http://www.eu-
oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/17/. 
Folketinget Website. 2010. EU-Oplysningen: What are the three pillars of the EU?  
[cited 20th May 2010]. Available from http://www.eu-
oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/12/. 
Fondation Robert Schuman. 2010. The Lisbon Treaty  2009 [cited 15th May 2010]. 
Available from http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/doc/divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf. 
Foreign Policy Analysis Website. 2010. International Studies Association: Blackwell 
Publishing [cited 25th May 2010]. Available from 
http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org/index.html. 
Gateway to the European Union: Europa Glossary. 2010.  [cited 15th May 2010]. 
Available from http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/index_en.htm. 
Gateway to the European Union: Fisheries and Maritime Affairs. 2009.  [cited 19th 
November 2009]. Available from http://europa.eu/pol/fish/index_en.htm  
Gateway to the European Union: Summaries of EU legislation. 2010.  [cited 20th 
May 2010]. Available from 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_pr
ocess/l33245_en.htm. 
Gateway to the European Union: The Lisbon Treaty. 2010.  [cited 15th May 2010]. 
Available from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm. 
Oxford Dictionaries. 2010. Compact Oxford English Dictionary  2010 [cited 27th 
June 2010]. Available from 
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/policy_1?view=uk. 
Swedish EU Presidency Website. 2010. Swedish EU Presidency  2009 [cited 25th 
June 2010]. Available from http://www.se2009.eu/. 
 94 
UK Local Government Association. 2010. Glossary of EU jargon  2010 [cited 30th 
June 2010]. Available from 
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=28946. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
Appendix i: Institutional competences in the EU 
Figure: Competences before and after the Lisbon Treaty 
Maastricht Treaty 1992 
First Pillar: European 
Communities 
Community method of decision-
making 
Second Pillar: CFSP 
Intergovernmental method of 
decision-making (Cooperation, 
common positions and joint 
actions) 
Third Pillar: Police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters 
Intergovernmental method of 
decision-making 
European Community (EC): 
- Customs union & Single market 
- EU competition law 
- Economic and monetary union 
- Common Agricultural Policy 
- Common Fisheries Policy 
-  Research  
- Environmental law 
- Regional Policy 
- Education and Culture 
- Trans-European Networks 
-  Healthcare 
-  Social policy 
-  Asylum policy 
-  Schengen treaty 
-  Immigration policy 
European Coal and Steel 
Community ( until 2002) 
European Atomic Energy 
Community  
Foreign policy:  
- Human rights 
- Democracy 
- Foreign aid 
- Peacekeeping 
Security policy: 
- European Security and Defence 
Policy 
- Financial aspects of defence 
- EU battle groups 
- Helsinki Headline Goal Force 
Catalogue 
 
 
- Police cooperation 
- Fighting organised crime 
- Drug trafficking and weapons 
smuggling 
- Terrorism 
- Trafficking in human beings 
- Bribery and fraud 
 
Lisbon Treaty 2009 
Exclusive competences 
in areas where the Union legislates 
alone 
Shared competences 
between the Union and Member 
States, with the States exercising 
their competence if the Union is 
not exercising its own 
Support competences 
Areas where the Member States 
have exclusive competence but in 
which the Union can provide 
support or co-ordination 
− Customs Union 
− Establishment of competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market 
− Monetary policy for Member States 
which use the euro as legal tender 
− Conservation of the biological 
resources of the sea as part of the 
common fisheries policy 
− Common trading policy 
− The conclusion of an international 
agreement when this is within the 
framework of one of the Union's 
legislative acts or when it is necessary 
to help it exercise an internal 
competence or if there is a possibility 
of the common rules being affected or 
of their range being changed. 
− Internal market 
− Social policy with regard to specific 
aspects defined in the treaty 
− Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion 
− Agriculture and fisheries except for 
the conservation of the biological 
resources of the sea 
− Environment 
− Consumer Protection 
− Transport 
− Transeuropean Networks 
− Energy 
− Area of freedom, security and justice 
− Joint security issues with regard to 
aspects of public health as defined in 
the Lisbon Treaty 
− Research, technological development 
and space 
− Development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid. 
− Protection and improvement of 
human healthcare 
− Industry 
− Culture 
− Tourism 
− Education, professional training, 
youth and sport 
− Civil protection 
− Administrative co-operation. 
(See: Eurlex: Access to European Law ; Fondation Robert Schuman 2009)  
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Appendix ii: Interview guides 
Interview guide: Respondents and informants from the EU 
1. Current position 
1.1 Title/rank 
1.2 What is your current job/occupation? 
2. Personal background 
2.1 What is your professional background? 
2.2 In what ways have you worked, or are you working with Arctic related issues? 
2.3 In what ways does your DG/unit work with Arctic issues? 
3. The Commission’s Communication 2008  
3.1 Could you tell me about the process within the Commission that led to the adoption of the 
Communication in 2008?  
3.1.1 Which DG’s were involved?  
3.1.2 Were some DG more active than others? 
3.1.3 Which DG was in charge?  
3.1.4 How did you decide on which DG was to take the lead?  
3.2 What role did your DG play in the process? 
3.2.1 Which issues or interests did your DG think particularly important to include in the 
Communication?  
3.2.2 How did the others respond? 
3.2.3 Did any issues cause particular discussion? 
3.2.4 What do you think about the final communication?  
3.3 In more general terms, could I just ask you to briefly explain your unit/ institution/ DG’s 
views concerning 
3.3.1 Arctic governance 
3.3.2 The proposed Arctic Treaty 
3.3.3 The proposed moratorium on oil and gas 
3.3.4 The sealing issue 
4. Commission internal coordination of Arctic issues 
4.1 How does the Commission coordinate its work on the Arctic?  
4.2 Would you say that the Commission has a well coordinated approach to Arctic issues today? 
4.3 How would you picture the coordination within the Commission with an Arctic policy?  
5. The European Parliament 
5.1 What do you think about the Parliament’s engagement towards the Arctic so far?  
5.2 In what ways have the Parliament contributed to the process? 
5.3 Does the Parliament have influence over the development of an EU Arctic policy? If yes, in 
what ways? 
5.4 Could you think of other concrete policy areas where the Parliament would have co-decision 
powers in the future?  
5.5 Could you tell me about the process leading to the Resolution in 2008?  
5.5.1 What party group came up with the idea?  
5.5.2 To what extent did the views of the different party groups converge on the content?  
5.5.3 What did you think were the most important issues to include in the document? 
5.5.4 Did any issues cause particular discussion? 
5.6 In what ways was the Resolution in 2009 different from the one in 2008? 
5.6.1 Who pushed for the Moratorium and the Arctic Treaty? 
5.6.2 Was there a uniform wish within the Parliament to push for the Moratorium and the 
Arctic Treaty? 
5.7 Why was the 2009 Resolution postponed? 
5.8 Would some parties still like to see an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium? 
5.9 What else is happening in the Parliament now concerning Arctic issues? 
6. Member states and the Council Conclusions 
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6.1 What have you heard about the member states’ views on the Arctic and the EU Arctic Policy? 
6. 1.1 Finland has been eager to develop the ND. What is Finland’s position on the EU’s 
proposed Arctic Policy?  
6.1.2 How would Denmark like the EU Arctic Policy to be? 
6.3 Could you tell me about the process leading to the Council Conclusions of 2009? 
6.3.1 What countries were actively engaged in the drafting? Who remained passive?  
6.3.2 Did particular issues cause debate?  
6.3.3 Could you say something about the views of Denmark, Sweden and Finland? To what 
extent did they converge? 
6.4 What do you think about the Council Conclusions? To what extent does it correspond to the 
view of your unit/ institution? 
6.5 Did the Commission have influence over the drafting process? How did you make your voice 
heard? 
7. Competences 
7.1 Is the Arctic Policy foreign policy? Or internal EU policy? 
7.1.1 Is the Arctic Policy first and foremost a Commission policy that will encompass only 
policy areas where the Commission has competence, or will it include areas that are under 
member state competence, such as energy? What about issues of mixed competence?  
7.2 If the EU is to develop a policy on the Arctic, will this entail developing legal measures, such 
as directives etc.?  
7.2.1 Do you think that the EU Arctic Policy will be such a policy, or will it be a guiding 
framework that does not necessitate any legislative actions? 
8. Other  
8.1 From whom did the idea of an EU policy come from? What institution has brought the Arctic 
issue onto the agenda? 
8.2 Is the ND foreign policy?  
8.2.1 In what ways is it relevant for the Arctic?  
8.2.2 What are the differences between the ND and the Arctic Policy? 
8.2.3 What role have the ND played in the process of developing a more coherent EU 
approach to the Arctic?  
8.3 Is there anything I should have asked you that I did not? 
8.4 Do you have anything to add?  
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Interview guide: Respondents and informants from Norway 
1. Current position 
1.1 Title/rank 
1.2 What is your current job/occupation? 
2. Personal background 
2.1 What is your professional background? 
2.2 In what ways have you worked, or are you working with Arctic related issues? 
2.3 In what ways do your department/ unit work with Arctic issues? 
3. Norway, the Commission and the Arctic 
3.1 Janos Herman, the EU Ambassador to Norway has clamed that the EU has a very good 
dialogue with Norway on Arctic issues. Could you tell me about how the Foreign Ministry works 
with the EU in relation to the Arctic? 
3.1.1 Who do you work with within the EU? 
3.1.2 What issues are on the agenda? 
3.1.3 Is the contact official? 
3.2 Is it correct that the European Commission consulted Norway when it developed its 
Communication in 2008?  
3.3 Could you say something about the process within the Commission at the time? 
3.3.1 When did it start and how long did it last? 
3.3.2 What DGs were in charge of formulating the document? 
3.3.3 What other DGs were represented? 
3.4 Could you describe the relationship between the DGs present?  
3.5 Did particular issues cause debate? If yes, what issues? 
3.6 What are your thoughts about the final document regarding its content? 
3.7 I have also heard that the Commission is planning on consulting Norway further on in the 
process towards the EU Arctic Policy, is this correct? 
3.7.1 How will this consultation take place? 
4. The member states 
4.1 Could you say something about your impression of the member states’ views on the Arctic 
and on the EU Arctic Policy? 
4.1.1 Are some countries more engaged than others? If yes, what are their views? 
4.2 Have you heard anything about the process ahead of the Council Conclusions in 2009?  
4.2.1 What countries were actively participating in the drafting and the discussions? 
4.2.2 What countries viewed an EU Arctic policy positively? 
4.2.3 What countries were sceptical? 
4.2.4 Did any particular issue cause debate or disagreement? 
5. The European Parliament 
5.1 What is the opinion of the Parliament as regards the role of the EU in the Arctic and the 
proposed Arctic Policy?  
5.1.1 Have you got the impression that the Parliament presents a unified position, or are there 
variations between the different party groups?  
5.2 Does the Parliament have influence over the process? If yes, what kind of influence? 
5.3 How is the Parliament’s engagement towards the Arctic received by the Commission and the 
Council?  
6. Other 
6.1 How would you characterise the EU’s engagement towards the Arctic so far?  
6.2 What challenges would you say that the EU has faced? 
6.3 What challenges would you say the EU will face in developing its Arctic Policy? 
6.3 Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Appendix iii: List of informants and respondents 
 
Informant A  Norwegian Government Official 
Informant B  Former Norwegian Diplomat 
Informant C  Norwegian Diplomat to the EU 
Informant D  Norwegian Regional Government Official 
 
Respondent A  EU Commission Official 
Respondent B EU Official  
Respondent C EU Commission Official 
Respondent D EU Commission Official 
Respondent E European Parliament Official 
Respondent F European Parliament Official 
Respondant G  European Parliament Political Advisor  
Respondant H Danish EU Official  
 
 
